Credit Information Sharing and Loan Default in Developing Countries: The Moderating Effect of Banking Market Concentration and National Governance Quality by Fosu, Samuel et al.
Credit Information Sharing and Loan Default in Developing Countries: The 
Moderating Effect of Banking Market Concentration and National Governance Quality 
 
Samuel Fosu1, Albert Danso1, Henry Agyei-Boapeah2, Collins G. Ntim3, Emmanuel Adegbite4 
 
 
Corresponding author: Email: samuel.fosu@dmu.ac.uk      
 
Abstract 
Departing from the existing literature, which associates credit information sharing with 
improved access to credit in advanced economies, we examine whether credit information 
sharing can also reduce loan default rate for banks domiciled in developing countries. Using a 
large dataset covering 879 unique banks from 87 developing countries from every continent, 
over a nine-year period (i.e., over 6,300 observations), we uncover three new findings. First, 
we find that credit information sharing reduces loan default rate. Second, we show that the 
relationship between credit information sharing and loan default rate is conditional on banking 
market concentration. Third, our findings suggest that governance quality at the country level 
does not have a strong moderating role on the effect of credit information sharing on loan 
default rate.  
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1. Introduction  
This study makes a number of new contributions to the existing literature by examining the: (i) 
effect of credit information sharing on loan default rates; and (ii) potential moderating roles 
that banking market concentration and national governance quality may play in the information 
sharing–loan default nexus, using a large dataset of 879 unique banks across 87 developing 
countries from every continent over a period of nine years (i.e., over 6,300 observations). This 
study is very important because recent years have witnessed some crucial reforms in several 
developing countries, including the development of credit information sharing schemes, 
financial sector reforms and improvements in political governance that are aimed at 
strengthening financial institutions by reducing credit default rates  (see Marquez, 2002; Brown 
et al., 2009). For instance, Brown et al. (2009) report that 17 out of the 27 transition countries 
in Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union established information sharing institutions 
between 1991 and 2005 alone. Furthermore, statistics based on World Bank data1 suggest that 
the depth of credit information shared among lenders in developing countries surged by over 
72% from 2004 to 2012 (i.e., depth of credit information index climbed from an average of 
2.47 in 2004 to 4.26 in 2012). Meanwhile, the quality of lending deteriorated over the same 
period, with the size of non-performing loans in banks’ portfolios rising from 6.3% in 2004 to 
7.0% in 2012. These developments make it an extremely relevant academic and policy issue to 
consider whether and under what industrial/institutional environments do credit information 
sharing schemes yield net benefits in developing economies.  
Against this backdrop, the current paper seeks to contribute to this topical issue regarding the 
value of credit information sharing schemes by examining the impact of credit information 
sharing on loan default rates in banks domiciled in developing economies. Economic theory 
suggests that information asymmetry leads to adverse selection and moral hazard problems in 
credit markets (Stiglitz and Weiss, 1981). When lenders cannot ex ante differentiate between 
safe and risky borrowers, they may lend in an inefficient manner by refusing credit to safe 
borrowers, while advancing loans to the risky ones and thereby increasing the average lending 
rate. This could adversely affect aggregate credit and credit risk, particularly when lending to 
risky borrowers becomes disproportionately higher to necessitate increasing interest rates. 
                                                          
1These statistics are based on our own computations using the relevant World Bank Doing Business (2016) data 
for our sampled countries over the period of investigation.  
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However, credit information sharing among lenders may help to overcome adverse selection 
problems in credit markets (Pagano and Jappelli, 1993) and reduce moral hazards by 
incentivising borrowers to repay loans (Padilla and Pagano, 2000) or by avoiding over-
borrowing when borrowers patronise multiple banks (Bennardo et al., 2015). Therefore, credit 
information could improve credit allocation and loan quality, especially in environments where 
severe information asymmetry prevails. 
While information problems arise in any market, they are particularly problematic in 
developing countries, often characterised by underdeveloped financial structures and 
institutional voids (Fosu, 2013; Amaeshi, Adegbite and Rajwani, 2016). Most developing 
countries tend to have relatively weak company laws and regulations protecting creditors’ 
rights coupled with weak enforcement of contracts, as well as a lack of transparency in 
corporate reporting (La Porta et al., 1997; Brown et al., 2009). The weak governance 
environment exacerbates the adverse selection and moral hazard problems, making it 
unfavourable for bank lending. These features make developing countries an interesting setting 
to study the potential role of credit information sharing in enhancing the quality of loans 
advanced by banks, as measured by the loan default rates. 
Prior studies considering the relevance of information sharing schemes have often focused on 
their effect on availability of credit and largely reported a positive information sharing effect 
(Jappelli and Pagano, 2002; Love and Mylenko, 2003; Brown et al., 2009; Fosu, 2014). 
However, evidence on the information sharing effect on credit default rates is relatively limited, 
with those few studies exploring the issue undertaking single-country analysis, and also often 
ignoring banks operating in other developing regions of the world. For example, Kallberg and 
Udell (2003), De Janvry et al. (2010) and Behr and Sonnekalb (2012) examine the issue in the 
specific contexts of the US, Guatemala and Albania, respectively. The lack of attention to the 
other markets, such as those in Africa, Asia and the Middle East is significant since information 
and credit accessibility problems are acute in most of these countries (Gwatidzo and Ojah, 
2014; Tunyi and Ntim, 2016; Agyei-Boapeah and Machokoto, 2018). Furthermore, the 
generalisability of the existing literature to these ignored contexts may be problematic, given 
the heterogeneity in the banking industry dynamics and macro-governance factors across 
countries. We, therefore, take advantage of the recent improvements in data coverage for 
information sharing to examine the effect of credit information sharing on loan default rates 
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using a large dataset of 879 banks across 87 developing countries (including banks from 26 
African markets) over a period of nine years (i.e., over 6,300 observations).  
The current study provides a number of important findings. First, we observe that credit 
information sharing leads to a decrease in banks’ loan default rate. Second, our findings suggest 
that the effect of credit information sharing on loan default rate is moderated by banking market 
concentration. Third, we find that country-level governance quality has little or no moderating 
role in shaping the effect of credit information sharing on loan default rate. Finally, our results 
indicate that banking market concentration increases loan default rate and its effect is 
accentuated by credit information sharing.  
The findings of this study, thus, allow us to make new contributions to the existing literature. 
First, we open up a new research space by providing the first evidence (to the best of our 
knowledge) on the relationship between credit information sharing and loan default rate for a 
large sample of banks in developing economies. In doing so, we shed light on the potential 
effect of recent reforms in most developing countries that seek to encourage information 
sharing through the establishment of credit bureaus or registries. Second, by conditioning the 
effect of credit information sharing on banking market concentration, we shed light on the 
complex interactions between credit information sharing, banking market concentration and 
loan default rate. In particular, we show that banking market concentration and credit 
information sharing are to some extent substitutes as far as loan default rate is concerned; 
hence, we highlight the potential distortions and risk-shifting effects of the pro-competition 
banking sector reforms in the absence of effective credit information sharing schemes. This 
further has policy implications given the on-going reforms in the financial sector of most 
developing countries that are aimed at promoting competition through credit information 
sharing (Marquez, 2002). Third, by conditioning the effect of credit information sharing on 
governance quality, we assess the extent to which national governance quality could substitute 
for or complement the role of credit information sharing in reducing bank loan defaults. Finally, 
we provide the first comprehensive study of the determinants of loan default rate in banks in 
developing economies, which are usually characterised by relatively significant institutional 
voids but remain severely under-researched.  
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows: Section 2 examines the relevant literature and 
develops our hypotheses. In Section 3, we discuss the sample, empirical design and 
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measurement of the key variables. Regression results and robustness checks are presented in 
Section 4 and, finally, Section 5 concludes the study with a summary of the main findings. 
 
2. Related literature and hypotheses 
2.1 Theory, credit information, bank lending and loan default  
Theoretically, the traditional functions of banks, which include liquidity provision (Diamond, 
1984) and delegated monitoring (Diamond and Dybvig, 1983), become more challenging when 
banks operate in opaque and weak governance environments such as those that prevail in many 
developing economies. Within this context, the quantity and quality of credit information that 
banks possess on existing and potential borrowers become critical resources that do not only 
assist them to effectively deliver a significant contribution to the financial system, but also help 
them in creating competitive advantage. Credit information sharing represents an effective 
means of enhancing both the quantity and quality of information available to banks to enable 
them make their lending decisions.  
The prior literature identifies at least two major theoretical channels through which credit 
information sharing can affect a bank’s lending decision (see Figure 1 in Appendix 1). The first 
is the adverse selection channel, shown in Pagano and Jappelli (1993), relating to banks 
deciding whether or not to lend to a new pool of potential borrowers. Pagano and Jappelli 
(1993) show that credit information sharing amongst banks can help lending banks make an 
accurate assessment of the credit worthiness of new (potential) borrowers. When each bank has 
private information about the credit worthiness of its ‘local’ borrowers but no information 
about other banks’ borrowers, they could face adverse selection in granting credit. However, if 
banks share private information about their ‘local’ borrowers, they can lend safely to other 
banks’ customers as well, in a way that decreases default rate. Overall, credit information 
sharing eases adverse selection problems by improving banks' knowledge of credit applicants' 
characteristics and permit more accurate prediction of repayment probability. This leads to an 
increased lending to safe borrowers and a reduced lending to risky borrowers and, thus, a 
decrease in loan default rate. 
Second, and from the moral hazard theoretical perspective, credit information sharing can 
further reduce borrower default by curbing the borrower hold-up problems as well as increasing 
borrower discipline (e.g., Vercammen, 1995; Padilla and Pagano, 2000). In the absence of a 
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credit information sharing scheme, individual banks incur the cost of obtaining private 
information about borrowers and shift these costs to borrowers (and perhaps even extract rent) 
by pricing their loans relatively high, and thereby leading to borrower default. By contrast, the 
presence of a credit information sharing system helps to reduce banks’ private costs and the 
extraction of informational rent, which in turn encourages borrowers’ repayment efforts, and 
subsequently reduces default risks (Padilla and Pagano, 1997). Moreover, an effective 
information sharing scheme enables defaulting borrowers to be blacklisted, making it virtually 
impossible for such ‘bad’ borrowers to access finance in the future or if they do, it is at an 
excessively higher cost. By this mechanism, credit information sharing mitigates borrowers’ 
moral hazards by instilling borrower discipline, improving repayment efforts and consequently 
minimising default risks (Klein, 1992; Vercammen, 1995; Padilla and Pagano, 2000). 
Furthermore, since the overall indebtedness of an individual borrower from all lending sources 
is revealed through information sharing, potential over-borrowing from multiple lenders is 
mitigated (Bennardo et al., 2015), which subsequently reduces individual borrowers’ debt 
burden as well as loan default rates. Collectively, both the adverse selection and moral hazard 
theoretical perspectives predict that credit information sharing should lead to enhanced bank 
lending and a reduced loan default rate. 
Empirically, several studies have investigated the link between credit information sharing and 
banking outcomes such as lending and loan default rates. For example, in a cross-sectional 
study of 43 countries, Jappelli and Pagano (2002) find that credit information sharing among 
lenders increases bank lending to the private sector, measured as the ratio of private credit to 
gross domestic product. They also find information sharing to significantly reduce country-
level (aggregate) borrower default. In a bank-level dataset from African economies and 
focusing exclusively on bank lending, Fosu (2014) reports that credit information sharing 
increases bank lending. Similarly, Brown et al. (2009) and Love and Mylenko (2003) report 
that information sharing reduces credit constraints on firms. Focusing more directly on the 
information sharing effect on borrowers, Gietzen (2017) provides evidence to suggest that 
information sharing in African banking markets reduces the interest rate profile of borrowers, 
especially for those repeated borrowers who switched banks. 
On the information sharing effect on loan default probability, Kallberg and Udell (2003), 
relying on US data, demonstrate that information sharing schemes have a predictive effect on 
business credit default, implying that information sharing could help banks to improve the 
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quality of their loans to corporations. Also, in Guatemala, De Janvry et al. (2010) show that 
credit information sharing schemes induce a moderate improvement in loan repayments. 
Similarly, Behr and Sonnekalb (2012), using loan-level data from a commercial bank serving 
micro-enterprises and SME borrowers in Albania report that the establishment of the 
information sharing scheme improved credit performance. They further find this effect to be 
more pronounced among repeat borrowers and conclude that the disciplinary effect of 
information sharing is stronger for clients that have already secured a relationship with the 
lender. Recently, Bos, de Haas, and Millone (2016) show that information sharing through 
credit registries in Bosnia and Herzegovina increases loan quality by tightening lending and 
increasing the rejection rate for small-business loan applications.   
While these prior studies enhance our understanding of the potential impact of information 
sharing on bank loan default, they have often been conducted within the context of a single 
country-specific setting, thus, limiting the generalisability of their findings. Additionally, the 
potential roles of industry-level concentration and country-level governance quality in shaping 
the information sharing effect remain largely unexplored in existing literature. We address 
these gaps in the current paper. Overall, the foregoing discussion suggests that credit 
information sharing reduces adverse selection costs and moral hazard problems, and thus 
enhances banks’ loan quality. Therefore, credit information sharing is expected to reduce loan 
default rate. We, therefore, formulate our first hypothesis as follows: 
H1: Credit information sharing reduces banks’ loan default rate. 
 
2.2 Credit information, banking concentration and loan default 
We argue in this section that the link between credit information sharing and the loan default 
rate of banks may be contingent on the levels of concentration in the banking industry. 
Specifically, we draw on the literature suggesting that banking market concentration may have 
an impact on banks’ lending decisions (e.g., Petersen and Rajan, 1995; Marquez, 2002; 
Hauswald and Marquez, 2006; Gietzen, 2017). Since banking sector concentration tends to be 
associated with a few large banks that have a large pool of borrowers (Marquez, 2002; 
Hauswald and Marquez, 2006), competition is generally stifled in such banking markets 
(Berger and Hannan, 1998) and the few large banks are able to easily assume a ‘too-big-to-fail’ 
status (Acharya et al., 2013). These features generally incentivise banks in concentrated 
markets to make risky and/or inefficient lending decisions, which increase loan default rates. 
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Based on a sample of 3,404 US firms surveyed in 1988-1989, Petersen and Rajan (1995) offer 
empirical evidence to suggest that risky decisions, such as lending to young firms, which are 
likely to be financially constrained, are encouraged in concentrated banking markets than in 
less concentrated markets. Similarly, Bonaccorsi and Dell’Ariccia (2004) analyse cross-
industry Italian data and find a positive effect of bank concentration on the emergence of new 
firms, suggesting an increased lending to risky entrepreneurial activities and business start-ups 
in concentrated banking markets. They further show an amplification of such risky lending in 
more informationally opaque industrial sectors.  
These arguments and evidence suggest that risky lending and, by extension, loan default rates 
may be higher in concentrated markets, and for that matter, credit information sharing may 
have a more critical role to play in such markets. However, a closer look at the theoretical 
rationale for the risky lending behaviour in concentrated markets rather suggests the opposite 
(i.e., a minimal role for credit information sharing in concentrated banking markets). For 
instance, in Petersen and Rajan’s (1995) theoretical framework, banking market concentration 
permits the building of closer and long-term ties between lenders and borrowers in such a way 
that the lender-banks are able to share in the future surplus of the borrower-firms. This is 
because, unlike in competitive banking markets, where borrowers can easily switch banks, the 
dynamics prevailing in concentrated banking markets lead to the establishment of a long-term 
lending relationship between the few top banks and their ‘loyal’ borrowers. This then facilitates 
the acquisition of ‘soft’ credit information by banks about their borrowers, as well as a 
willingness on the part of the lenders to disregard available negative credit information about 
important customers, but rather focus on the future rent that the bank can extract from its 
borrowers. In such an environment, credit information sharing is likely to yield minimal 
benefits, and the average quality of loans will be lower, resulting in higher default rates.   
Similar conclusions are drawn from Cetorelli and Peretto (2000), who present a model in which 
banks have access to a costly screening technology which allows them to discriminate between 
high- and low-quality borrowers. If a bank incurs the cost to acquire this screening technology, 
competitor banks are able to freely extract the information about the screened borrower through 
that bank’s decision to grant or deny a loan to the screened borrower. This leads to 
informational externality that generates a free-riding problem, and thus weakening banks’ 
incentives to incur the cost of screening and to carry out an information-based (efficient) 
lending strategy. Within this theoretical framework, concentrated banking markets have a 
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higher incentive to internally produce information and effectively screen loan applicants due 
to a reduced free-riding problem when competitors are few. Therefore, the potential benefits 
accruing from a public credit information sharing scheme may be minimal in concentrated 
banking markets. A related argument is that since banks in concentrated markets may find 
information sharing to be less useful, the individual banks may be less willing to share 
information with each other.2 This can again reduce any potential benefit of credit information 
sharing schemes in concentrated banking markets.    
In sum, the key implication of both theoretical models of Petersen and Rajan (1995) and 
Cetorelli and Peretto (2000) with respect to the relevance of credit information sharing schemes 
is that the potential benefits of reduced loan default rates associated with having a public credit 
information sharing system may be minimal, if not completely absent, in concentrated banking 
markets. This is due to the view that banks in concentrated markets may possess adequate 
internal mechanisms (e.g., long-term relationships or screening tools) to be able to generate 
quality information about their borrowers. Accordingly, our second hypothesis is as follows:   
H2: The effect of credit information sharing on loan default rate is conditional on banking 
market concentration. 
 
2.3 Credit information, governance quality and loan default 
We take the view that the nature of the institutional environment in which banks operate is 
likely to impact the relationship between information sharing and loan default rate. Drawing 
from institutional theory in the management and international business literature (e.g., Barley 
and Tolbet, 1997; Hanousek and Kochanova, 2016), our core argument in this section is that 
banks in specific institutional settings may reap more or fewer benefits from credit information 
sharing than their counterparts operating elsewhere. To start with, organisational behaviour, 
culture, practices and performance generally differ across countries due to institutional 
differences such as governance quality in the form of the effectiveness of rule of law, regulatory 
quality and control of corruption, among others (Dodd and Gilbert, 2016; Hearn et al., 2017). 
Martins et al. (2014) argue that enforcement of contracts depends on the quality of country-
level governance, implying that moral hazard problems arising from weak legal structures may 
vary across countries. Although countries in developing economies are largely characterised 
by institutional voids (Amaeshi et. al. 2016; Agyei-Boapeah and Machokoto, 2018) such as 
                                                          
2We are grateful to an anonymous reviewer for suggesting this argument. 
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weak enforcement of laws and laxity in fighting corruption, there is also a wide variation in the 
quality of governance across countries, with some having better governance structures than 
others. Banks operating in countries with severe institutional voids may thus face relatively 
higher cost since they need to incur additional costs in order to enforce their loan contracts. 
Higher loan enforcement costs may subsequently lead to greater agency problems and higher 
loan default rates in countries with poor national governance quality.  
The empirical literature largely suggests that corporate outcomes are adversely affected when 
firms operate in poor macro-governance environments. For example, Hanousek and 
Kochanova (2016) utilise a sample from 14 Central and Eastern European countries to suggest 
that bribery and corruption at the national level negatively impact firms’ sales and productivity 
growth. This implies increased loan default rates in highly corrupt countries. Similarly, Li et 
al. (2006) find that macro-governance characteristics substantially explain the cross-country 
variations in the effectiveness of managerial monitoring mechanisms at the firm level. 
Specifically, they show that effective managerial monitoring systems (i.e., reduced agency 
problems) are more prevalent in countries with stronger shareholder rights, greater access to 
voting rights, more effective legal enforcement and extensive financial disclosures. To the 
extent that poor corporate governance in the form of ineffective managerial monitoring may be 
correlated with poor financial performance, it is reasonable to equally suggest that higher loan 
default rates for banks operating in poor national governance environments are highly likely.     
Within the context of the role of information sharing in shaping lending decisions and default 
risk in the banking sector, research on the effect of national governance quality is very much 
lacking. The few existing studies examining the issue have largely focused on the link between 
information sharing and bank lending (e.g., Brown et al., 2009; Fosu, 2014) and they note that, 
although information sharing is associated with improved credit availability and lower cost of 
credit to firms, its effect is minimal in countries with high governance quality. Thus, it seems 
that the relatively lower agency and information asymmetry problems in better-governed 
countries limit the expected benefits of credit information sharing in such environments. Credit 
information sharing may, therefore, not significantly impact loan default risks in better-
governed countries. Put differently, information sharing may play a substitution role to 
institutional (national governance) quality as it mitigates the effects of weak protection 
afforded to creditors. In the light of the above discussion, we formulate our final hypothesis as 
follows: 
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H3: The effect of credit information sharing on loan default rate is moderated by national 
governance quality. 
 
3. Data and empirical methodology  
3.1. Data description 
Bank-level data for this study was obtained from Bankscope, which contains information on 
banks around the world. The study’s sample period is from 2004 – 2012.3 In line with existing 
literature (e.g., Fosu, 2013; Beck et al., 2013), a number of exclusion criteria were applied. 
These include the exclusion of countries with fewer than 10 bank-year observations. Also, 
banks with fewer than three consecutive years of observations were excluded. Finally, bank-
year observations with missing data on key variables were also dropped. Overall, a total of 879 
banks from 87 developing countries4 from every continent were employed in our analysis. The 
list of countries and distribution of the sample showing the contribution of each country is 
presented as an appendix (see Table 12). The top five countries represented in the sample are 
Turkey (5.69%), Argentina (3.75%), Hong Kong (3.64%), Kenya (3.19%), and South Africa 
(3.07%). The least represented countries are Algeria, Benin, Ethiopia, Grenada, Guyana, 
Maldives, Montenegro, Rwanda, Sierra Leone, Tajikistan, and Togo, all contributing 0.23% 
each to the sample. Information sharing variables and other macroeconomic variables used in 
the study were obtained from the World Bank Doing Business and the World Bank World 
                                                          
3Our sample period starts from 2004 because the World Bank Doing Business (WBDB) database on credit 
information sharing starts from 2004. There was a methodological change in the construction of the credit 
information sharing index in 2012. The index, therefore, now ranged from 0 to 8 instead of 0 to 6. To avoid the 
potential confounding effects of this methodological change, as well as to be consistent with prior studies (e.g. 
Kalyvas and Mamatzakis, 2017), we decided to employ 2012 as our cut-off period. We also note that our sample 
period covers the period of the recent global financial crisis (2007-2009) which affected the level of bank loans 
and default rates. In unreported robustness analysis, which excludes the crisis period, our main results reported in 
this study and the conclusions drawn from them are not affected. These results are available upon request. 
4We define developing countries based on United Nation’s Country Classifications contained in the World 
Economic Situation and Prospects. See links for the UN reports containing list of countries in 2014 (p.146) and 
2018 (p.142): 
http://www.un.org/en/development/desa/policy/wesp/wesp_current/2014wesp_country_classification.pdf 
https://www.un.org/development/desa/dpad/wp-content/uploads/sites/45/publication/WESP2018_Full_Web-
1.pdf  
Although China and India are classed as developing countries, they are excluded from our sample because they 
do not have country-level credit information sharing indexes. Rather, these countries have city-level credit 
information sharing indexes. In untabulated analyses, which include the city-level indexes for Shanghai (China) 
and Mumbai (India), with our main conclusions remaining unchanged. 
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Development Indicators, respectively. Governance variables were obtained from the World 
Bank’s Worldwide Governance indicators.  
 
3.2. Measurement of variables 
The measures used in this study were chosen in line with the previously discussed empirical 
and theoretical literature, which enabled us to compare our results with prior research. We draw 
on the extant literature (e.g., Berger, 2009; Louzis et al., 2012; Vazquez et al., 2012; Jiménez 
et al., 2013 Demirgüç-Kunt et al., 2003; Ghosh, 2015; Kalyvas and Mamatzakis, 2017) and 
include a number of bank-specific and macroeconomic variables in our analysis. These 
variables are presented in Table 1 and are discussed below. 
3.2.1. Credit information sharing and loan default rate 
Consistent with the emerging empirical literature on the role of information sharing on credit 
markets (e.g., Fosu, 2014; Nana, 2014; Kalyvas and Mamatzakis, 2017), we adopt the depth of 
credit information sharing index as our main measure of information sharing. This index 
“measures rules and practices affecting the coverage, scope and accessibility of credit 
information available through either a public credit registry or a private credit bureau” (World 
Bank Doing Business, 2016)5. The index is constructed by the World Bank in two stages. First, 
banking supervision authorities and other public sources (e.g., government officials) are 
surveyed to confirm the presence of public credit registries and private credit bureaus. Second, 
a detailed survey about their structure, law, and associated rules is administered to the registry 
or bureau.  Over our sample period, the index ranges from 0 to 6, where higher values indicate 
the availability of more credit information to help in lending decisions. An index of zero means 
that the public credit registry or private credit bureau is non-operational, or its coverage falls 
below 0.1% of the adult population. By contrast, the maximum score of six is assigned to a 
country that has an operational credit registry or private credit bureau (and covers at least 0.1% 
of the adult population) in addition to the following five pieces of information: (i) both positive 
and negative information; (ii) data on households and firms; (iii) data on retailers and utility 
providers as well as financial institutions; (iv) more than 2 years of data; and (v) data on loans 
below 1% of income per capita. Thus, an index of 2 and above does not merely indicate the 
                                                          
5A more detailed description of the information sharing measures can be found at World Bank, Doing Business 
project (http://www.doingbusiness.org/). 
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presence of a credit information sharing system in a country but captures the quality (depth) of 
a country’s credit information sharing infrastructure.   
For our robustness checks, we adopt two other measures of credit information sharing. These 
are credit registry (public) coverage and credit bureau (private) coverage, both expressed as a 
percentage of the adult population. Credit registry coverage measures the number of individuals 
and firms listed by a public credit registry concerning the information on their borrowing and 
credit history (e.g., repayment history, unpaid debts, or credit outstanding) for the past five 
years. Similarly, credit bureau coverage measures the number of individuals or firms listed in 
a private credit bureau concerning the information on their borrowing history for the past five 
years. Overall, our measures of credit information sharing are consistent with Barth et al. 
(2009) and Büyükkarabacak and Valev (2012) who, respectively, explore the effect of credit 
information sharing on corruption in bank lending and on banking crisis. Unlike studies such 
as Kallberg and Udell (2003) and Giannetti et al. (2017) who employed micro-level measures 
of credit information sharing, our macro-level alternative allows us to consider a broad array 
of credit information about households and firms, from both public (mandatory) and private 
(voluntary) sources. Moreover, the use of the country-level measure of credit information 
sharing helps to minimize endogeneity concerns since the variable is largely exogenous to the 
firm. However, our measures of credit information sharing are not without limitation. For 
instance, they only capture “hard information” on creditworthiness (Büyükkarabacak and 
Valev, 2012) and also provide less detailed breakdown of the type of information shared 
(Kallberg and Udell, 2003).   
Following the literature (e.g., Chu et al., 2007; Berger et al., 2009; Louzis et al., 2012; Vazquez 
et al., 2012; Jiménez et al., 2013; Ghosh, 2015), our study utilises the ratio of non-performing 
loans to total loans (NPL) as the measure of loan default rate. In our robustness analysis in 
Section 4.6, we utilise the net charge off rates as an alternative measure of loan default rates. 
Table 13 in the appendix presents the mean values of our loan default measure and our main 
measure of credit information sharing (Depth). As can be seen from Table 13, there is high 
variability in loan default and the depth of credit information sharing across countries in our 
sample. 
3.2.2. Concentration 
In the light of the extant literature (e.g., Beck et al., 2006; Fosu, 2014; Dietrich, 2016, Chen et 
al., 2018), we measure banking market concentration by using the three-bank concentration 
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ratio defined as the share of assets of the three largest banks, expressed as a percentage of the 
entire banking assets. The choice of this measure as against other alternative measures (e.g., 
the Lerner index, Herfindahl–Hirschman Index and five-bank concentration as in Sharma et al. 
(2015) and Fosu et al. (2018)) is due to the fact that the sample size changes over the sample 
period and this could lead to a measurement error if we utilised more than the top three banks 
(see Beck et al., 2006). 
3.2.3. Other bank-specific factors 
The econometric models we specify in our study also account for other bank-specific variables. 
These include bank size, lending specialisation, bank capital and profit. Bank size may be an 
important determinant of loan default because larger banks can assume a ‘too-big-to-fail’ 
attitude and thus engage in more risky lending (Kane, 2010; Acharya et al., 2013; Ghosh, 2013; 
Hu and Mao, 2017; Goenner, 2018). This can result in increased loan default rate. Bank size is 
defined as the logarithm of total bank assets. An increase in the lending specialisation may lead 
to an increase in efficiency, hence, a lower loan default rate (e.g., Petersen and Rajan 1995). 
However, increased lending growth driven by supply side incentives can lead to less stringent 
lending and ultimately increased loan default rate (Keeton, 2013). We measure lending 
specialisation as the percentage of total loans to total assets. 
Furthermore, bank capital accounts for the effects of leverage on risk level and the required 
risk premium (Lepetit et al., 2008). From a moral hazard perspective, banks with significant 
equity capital may have lower incentives to take risk (Sharpe, 1978; Furlong and Keeley, 1989). 
However, the ‘too-big-to-fail’ hypothesis suggests that highly capitalised banks may have 
stronger incentives to engage in more risky lending due to their larger capital base (Kane, 2010; 
Acharya et al., 2013). Thus, the impact of capital on bank default can be ambiguous. Bank 
capital is measured as the ratio of book value of equity to total assets. Finally, bank profitability 
may be associated with managerial efficiency, in which case highly profitable banks are 
expected to have a lower default rate (Berger and DeYoung, 1997). However, profitability 
could be driven by managerial incentives, which can result in lower loan quality (Rajan, 1994; 
Ghosh, 2015). We measure profit as the ratio of operating profit to total assets. 
3.2.4. Macroeconomic and governance variables 
In line with other past empirical studies (e.g., Berger et al., 2009; Demirgüç-Kunt et al., 2003; 
Ghosh, 2015), we control for a number of country-specific traits. This is to ensure that the 
relationship between credit information sharing and loan default rate is not driven by 
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macroeconomic variations. These variables include inflation, measured as the annual 
percentage change in consumer price index. This accounts for possible uncertainty in the credit 
market (Fosu, 2014). We also include growth in gross domestic product (GDP Growth), which 
is measured as the annual percentage change in real GDP. The inclusion of this variable is to 
account for changes in credit demand within a country, as well as the possible variations in 
adverse selection and moral hazards in business cycles (Altunbas et al., 2009; Andrianova et 
al., 2015). In addition to the variables described above, we also include a number of governance 
indicators. These include rule of law, control of corruption and regulatory quality. The rule of 
law measures “perceptions of the extent to which agents have confidence in and abide by the 
rules of society, and in particular the quality of contract enforcement, property rights, the 
police, and the courts, as well as the likelihood of crime and violence” (Kaufmann et al., 2011, 
p. 223). The control of corruption index measures “perceptions of the extent to which public 
power is exercised for private gain, including both petty and grand forms of corruption, as well 
as ‘capture’ of the state by elites and private interests” (Kaufmann et al., 2011, p. 223). Finally, 
the regulatory quality index captures “perceptions of the ability of the government to formulate 
and implement sound policies and regulations that permit and promote private sector 
development” (Kaufmann et al., 2011, p. 223). 
 
3.3. Descriptive statistics and correlations 
In Table 1, we present the summary statistics of the variables used in this study. The 
information is confined to 6,323 observations.  
[Table 1 about here] 
A few findings are worth noting. The average value of loan default is 6% and ranges between 
0% and 28%. This suggests a high degree of heterogeneity across banks. The mean value of 
depth of credit information index (which is our main measure of credit information sharing) is 
3.54. This variable ranges between 0 and 6 and has a standard deviation of 2.41. These values 
suggest a moderate depth of credit information with a fair degree of heterogeneity across 
countries. The mean values of our alternative measures of credit information sharing (i.e., credit 
registry coverage and credit bureau coverage) are 9.37% and 29%, respectively. Credit bureau 
exhibits the highest degree of variability with a standard deviation of 18.20. The mean values 
of the governance measures of rule of law and control of corruption are both negative, 
suggesting that governance quality for developing countries is below the world average. The 
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only exception is the governance indicator of regulatory quality, which is marginally above the 
world average. 
It is noteworthy that most of our variables (including our measures for loan default and 
information sharing), exhibit considerable between- and moderate within-country variations, 
permitting the use of panel data estimation methods to identify our parameters of interest (see, 
Baltagi et al, 2009). For instance, our primary information sharing measure, the depth of credit 
information index, shows a within-country standard deviation of 1.12, suggesting some 
improvements in information sharing in some, if not all, developing countries over our sample 
period. In fact, as many as 23 countries in our sample showed major improvements in credit 
information sharing over the sample period. We define significant improvement to include 
cases where we observe at least a 5-unit change in the depth of credit information index from 
the beginning to the end of the sample period (2004-2012). For example, a country with an 
initial index of zero (one) but moves to five or above (six) during the sample period is classified 
as having showed a major improvement. Out of the 23 countries that showed major 
improvements, 12 showed sharp improvements, with the remaining 11 taking a gradual process 
towards attaining improved information sharing.6 We define sharp improvements to include 
improvements where the increase in the depth of credit information index between any two 
consecutive years is at least 5. All other cases of improvements are classified as gradual. Figure 
2 shows the average indices over time for the group of countries with sharp and those with 
gradual improvements.    
[Figure 2 about here] 
[Table 2 about here] 
Finally, Table 2 presents the correlation among the variables, and it shows that the depth of 
credit information is negatively associated with bank loan default rate. Similarly, the credit 
bureau coverage is negatively related to loan default, whilst credit registry coverage has a 
seemingly weak positive correlation with loan default. This suggest that the two measures 
perhaps capture different attributes of information sharing, as credit registry, unlike private 
bureau, is largely a regulatory tool. All the governance indicators are negatively correlated with 
                                                          
6The list of countries showing major improvements in information sharing include: Costa Rica, Croatia, 
Kazakhstan, Lithuania, Macedonia (Fyrom), Mauritius, Mongolia, Oman, Romania, Saudi Arabia, Serbia, 
Albania, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Egypt, Georgia, Ghana, Latvia, Morocco, Rwanda, United Arab 
Emirates, Zambia. Please note that the countries in italics (bold) experienced gradual (sharp) improvements in 
information sharing during the sample period.   
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loan default. These indicators are strongly correlated with one another; however, this poses no 
concerns about multicollinearity as these variables do not enter the regression at the same time. 
Further, there is no issue of multicollinearity with any of the causal variables employed. 
Overall, the descriptive statistics and the correlation matrix suggest that statistical problems 
such as lack of variations and multicollinearity are unlikely to plague our analysis. 
3.4 Estimation method 
We formulate empirical models in this section to test out our main hypotheses. To do this, and 
consistent with the extant literature, we adopt a panel data approach which permits bank- and 
country-level variables to vary across time. To cater for the likelihood that loan default rate 
may not have been observed under long-run equilibrium for any given year, we adopt a 
dynamic estimation approach (Vazquez et al. 2012; Jiménez et al. 2013) in order to 
accommodate the possibility of partial adjustment towards equilibrium (see Baltagi et al, 2009). 
Also, we adopt a logit transformation of NPL in our empirical modelling to map the dependent 
variable, which has a theoretical range between 0 and 1, to the real number line (Jiménez et al., 
2013) and also to permit inference based on Gaussian errors (Vazquez, 2012). Our baseline 
model is, therefore, presented as:  
, , 1
1 , 2 , , , , ,
1, , 1
ln ln
1 1
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i t i t
j t j t k i k t j t i t
Ki t i t
NPL NPL
Info CR BS MG
NPL NPL
      

   
                
  (1)             
where ji represents the bank i  in country j  in t  time period. 
,i tNPL , our main measure of 
loan default rate, is the ratio of non-performing loans to total loans; ,i tInfo  is the credit 
information sharing index, which is alternately the depth of credit information sharing, credit 
registry coverage and private credit bureau coverage. ,i tCR  is the banking market concentration 
ratio; ,i tBS is bank-specific variables; ,i tMG is macroeconomic and governance variables (that 
is, GDP growth rate and inflation) and governance indicator, which is alternately rule of law, 
regulatory quality and control of corruption; and 
,i t is an error term composed of bank fixed 
effect ( i ) and an independently and identically distributed component with zero mean and 
constant variance (
ti, ). 
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We derive the effect of credit information sharing on the untransformed NPL, evaluated at the 
sample mean of NPL (Vazquez et al., 2012). Specifically, the short-run and the long-run effects 
are derived as in Eqs. (2) and (3), respectively: 
   11 1 100
NPL
NPL NPL e
Info
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       (3) 
Eqs. (1) to (3) permit us to test our first hypothesis. In order to test the next two hypotheses, 
we modify Eq. (1) by including interaction terms of credit information sharing variables with 
banking market concentration. We then obtain Eq. (4) as follows: 
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            (4)           
The equivalent short-run and long-run marginal effects of credit information sharing on the 
untransformed NPL are, respectively, derived as follows:    
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Similarly, we derive the marginal effect of banking market concentration on the untransformed 
NPL by differentiating Eq. (4) with respect to the information sharing variable, and evaluating 
at the sample mean of NPL as follows: 
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We adopt a similar approach to provide further extensions, for example, to assess the 
moderating roles of governance quality on the marginal effect of credit information sharing.  
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The estimation of Eqs. (1) and (4) poses an endogeneity problem. First, the bank fixed effects 
may be correlated with other explanatory variables. We address this problem by first 
differencing the equations to wipe out the bank fixed effects. Second, the lagged dependent 
variables are, by construction, correlated with the differenced error terms. This problem can be 
addressed by using the difference generalised method of moments (GMM) estimator proposed 
by Arellano and Bond (1991), where the lagged levels of the endogenous variables are used as 
instruments for the differenced equation in Eqs. (1) and (4). The absence of serial correlation 
in the original error term,
ti, , and the weak exogeneity of the explanatory variables will 
permit the following moment conditions: 
  ;0,,  tiStiyE   for 2;   3,...,s t T     (9) 
 , , 0;i t s i tE X     for 2;   3,...,s t T                (10) 
However, for reasons such as persistence or measurement errors, lagged levels of the 
explanatory variables may not be efficient instruments for their first differences (Blundell and 
Bond, 1998; Alonso-Borrego and Arellano, 1999). Efficiency can be improved by combining 
the levels equation with the differenced equation as a system of equations (Arellano and Bover, 
1995; Blundell and Bond, 1998). In this case, the lagged first-differenced variables can serve 
as instruments for the corresponding variables in levels, leading to the following additional 
moment conditions7: 
  ;0,,   tiStiyE   for 1s      (11) 
 , , 0;i t s i tE X    for 1s      (12) 
By construction, first-order serial correlation in the first-differenced equation is expected. 
However, second-order serial correlation in the differenced equation would suggest possible 
first-order serial correlation in the level equations (Roodman, 2009) and undermine the moment 
condition. Hence, we compute diagnostic tests of first-order and second-order serial correlation 
tests. We also test for the validity of the over-identification restrictions using Hansen test of 
                                                          
7Note that the most recent lagged differences are used in order to avoid redundant moment conditions (see Arellano and Bover, 
1995). 
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over-identifying restrictions. Finally, we correct the standard errors for finite sample bias using 
the two-step covariance matrix proposed by Windmeijer (2005). 
 
4. Results and discussion 
This section presents the estimation results of the paper. We first present the results for our 
baseline models, where loan default rate is explained by credit information sharing (Tables 3 
and 4). We then follow this up by conditioning the effect of credit information sharing 
individually on banking market concentration (in Tables 5 and 6) and national governance 
quality (in Table 7). We further subject our results to a range of robustness tests in Tables 8 
and 9. We restrict the maximum lag-dependent variable to 1 since we seek to reduce the number 
of moment conditions. As can be seen in Tables 3 to 9, the lagged dependent variables do enter 
all regressions with statistically significant coefficients, justifying the use of a dynamic model 
approach in our estimation. The Hansen test p-values are all above 0.1, suggesting that the 
over-identification restrictions are valid. Finally, we cannot reject the absence of second-order 
serial correlation in our models, which is further evidence that our use of a dynamic model is 
appropriate. 
 
4.1 Credit information sharing and loan default rates 
We present our main findings as follows. First, our baseline results, presented in Table 3, 
suggest that credit information sharing reduces loan default rate. In Models 1 to 3, we use the 
depth of credit information index as our main measure of credit information sharing. We then 
control alternately for governance indicators of rule of law (Law), regulatory quality 
(Regulation) and control of corruption (Control). It is important to highlight that the 
governance indicators are not jointly included in the model since they are highly correlated.8 
The depth of credit information index enters each of the regressions with a negative sign and a 
statistical significance at the 1% level. In fact, the effect of credit information sharing is 
economically significant.  
                                                          
8The correlation among the governance indicators is at least 0.83 and this could cause multicollinearity problems 
when they are included in the model together. On the contrary, the correlations among the other country-level 
variables (Depth, Concentration, Governance, GDP Growth, and Inflation) are moderate (less than 0.21) and 
could thus be included together in the model without serious econometric concerns. The results remain 
qualitatively similar when the country-level variables (other than the governance indicators) are also included 
alternately in the model. These results are available upon request.  
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[Table 3 about here] 
Applying Eq. (2) and (3), we present the short-run and long-run marginal effects of the depth 
of credit information sharing in Table 4. The results suggest that a one standard deviation 
change (2.41) in the depth of credit information sharing will reduce loan default rate by up to 
0.92 percentage points in the short run and 3.35 percentage points in the long run.9 Practically, 
for an average firm in our sample with a credit information sharing index (Depth) of 3.54, a 
one standard deviation increase would bring credit information sharing index to 5.95 (i.e., 
almost the maximum of 6). With a near-maximum credit information sharing index, one can 
expect a significant reduction in the average banks’ default risk from 6% to 2.65% in the long 
run.   
 [Table 4 about here] 
We confirm our findings of the negative relationship between information sharing and loan 
default rates in the next six models of Table 3 using alternative measures of information 
sharing, namely, credit registry coverage (Models 4-6) and credit bureau coverage (Models 7-
9). The coefficients of the credit registry (Registry) and private bureau (Bureau) coverage are 
both negative and statistically significant. The marginal effect analyses presented in Table 4 
suggest that a one standard deviation (13.01) increase in credit registry coverage is associated 
with between 0.51 and 0.53 percentage points reduction in loan default in the short run and 
between 1.92 and 1.95 percentage points in the long run. On private bureau, the results suggest 
that a one standard deviation (31.42) change in the coverage of private bureau is associated 
with up to a 1.19 and 3.98 percentage points reduction in loan default in the short and long run, 
respectively. 
Overall, these findings provide support for Hypothesis 1 and thus are broadly consistent with 
previous literature, which suggests that credit information sharing improves bank lending 
(Jappelli, and Pagano, 2002; Brown et al., 2009; Fosu, 2014) and credit quality (Jappelli, and 
Pagano, 2002; Behr and Sonnekalb, 2012). Our findings also suggest that prior studies such as 
De Janvry et al. (2010) that found information sharing to be associated with only marginal 
improvements in loan repayments may have underestimated the potential benefit of 
information sharing on loan default rates. It is also plausible that the average gain for 
                                                          
9The magnitude of the economic significance that we find is similar to the findings of Vazquez et al. (2012) who 
examine the impact of GDP on default rate in Brazil (see page 76 of their paper). 
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information sharing in developing countries is higher than that which is observed in Guatemala 
(see, De Janvry et al., 2010). Interestingly, our long-run estimates of 3.12 to 3.98 percentage 
point reductions in default rates resulting from information sharing (based on depth and bureau 
measures) are similar to the estimated improvements in loan repayments of 3 percentage points 
in Albania (see Behr and Sonnekalb, 2012). Our findings also support the theoretical view that 
the benefits of reduced adverse selection and moral hazard problems associated with credit 
information sharing among lenders may result in improvement in banks’ loan quality (Pagano 
and Jappelli, 1993; Vercammen, 1995; Padilla and Pagano, 2000).  
Second, the coefficients on banking market concentration in Table 3 offer an important insight: 
they are positive and statistically significant at the 1% level in all models, suggesting that 
banking market concentration increases loan default. The effect of concentration on loan 
default rate is also economically significant. For instance, a one standard deviation increase in 
concentration increases loan default by as much as 1.24 (based on Model 3) percentage points 
in the short run. Similarly, based on Model 5, the same increase in concentration can increase 
loan default by 4.71 percentage points in the long run.10 These results are to some extent in 
contrast with the strand of literature which suggests that banking market concentration fosters 
relationship building, hence, enabling the acquisition of soft credit information. For instance, 
contrary to Petersen and Rajan (1995) and Cetorelli and Peretto (2000), our findings seem to 
suggest that banks in concentrated markets may not have any screening informational 
advantage from their long-term relationships with their borrowers. Therefore, they are unable 
to reduce the adverse selection problem to consequently improve their loan quality. In fact, it 
is plausible that default rates may rise in concentrated banking markets if the borrowers take 
advantage of their longstanding relationships with the banks to renege on their repayment 
commitments.  
Further, it is plausible for there to be informational advantage for the few top banks in 
concentrated markets, but for the banks to disregard the information and lend inefficiently 
(Bonaccorsi and Dell’Ariccia, 2004), which may be due to the absence of competition (Berger 
and Hannan, 1998) or the presence of governments’ ‘too-big-to-fail’ bailout arrangements 
(Acharya et al., 2013). In fact, consistent with our findings, Berger et al. (2009) provide 
evidence in support of this line of argument – they show a significant positive impact of 
banking market concentration on loan default rates. Given the conflicting theoretical 
                                                          
10A separate table for the marginal effect of concentration is not reported for brevity but is available upon request.   
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predictions regarding the real effect of banking market concentration, we provide further 
analysis in subsection 4.2.  
We draw further insights into what drives bank loan default rate from the coefficients on other 
control variables. The coefficients on Lending is negative and largely statistically significant. 
This finding is consistent with Berger et al. (2009,) and Jiménez et al. (2013) and suggests that 
banks with higher lending specialisation have lower loan defaults. Contrary to Jiménez et al. 
(2013), however, but consistent with Ghosh (2015), we find that banks that are efficient have 
lower loan defaults, as shown by the statistically significant negative coefficient on Profit 
across all models. Size and Capital are positive, but often insignificant. In line with previous 
studies (e.g., Berger et al., 2009; Buncic and Melecky, 2013; Jiménez et al., 2013), the results 
further suggest that GDP growth reduces loan defaults. Consistent with Ghosh (2015), we find 
some evidence that inflation reduces default rate, albeit not robustly. 
Third, the governance indicators of the rule of law (Law), regulatory quality (Regulation) and 
control of corruption (Control) all have a negative impact on loan default rate. However, the 
coefficients on rule of law are statistically insignificant across all models. The negative impact 
of governance quality on loan default suggests that the macro-level governance infrastructure 
of a country either helps banks to effectively enforce their loan contracts at minimal costs or 
incentivise borrowers to willingly commit to loan repayments. Hence, loan defaults appear to 
be lower in better-governed regimes.  
  
4.2 Information sharing, loan default and banking concentration 
The results presented in the preceding section conditioned bank loan default on the level of 
credit information sharing. However, to the extent that banking market concentration reduces 
the dispersion of credit information (Marquez 2002; Fosu, 2014) and increases the degree of 
credit market screening (Cetorelli and Peretto, 2000) and the acquisition of soft credit 
information through relationship banking (Petersen and Rajan, 1995), we now proceed to 
condition the relationship between credit information sharing and loan default rate on banking 
market concentration. We present the findings in Table 5. 
[Table 5 about here] 
In Models 1 to 3 of Table 5, we confirm the negative relationship between credit information 
sharing and loan default rate. We also find evidence for the moderating role of banking market 
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concentration on the credit information sharing–loan default rate nexus. The coefficients on the 
depth of credit information sharing remain negative and statistically significant. Interestingly, 
the coefficients on the interaction terms between credit information sharing and banking market 
concentration are positive and statistically significant, suggesting that the reduction in loan 
default rate arising from credit information sharing is lower in concentrated banking markets.  
We confirm the moderating effect of banking market concentration on the relationship between 
credit information sharing and loan default rate in Models 4 to 9 of Table 5. In Models 4 to 6, 
the coefficients on the credit registry (Registry) coverage remain negative and statistically 
significant at the 1% level, whilst the coefficients on the interaction term between this variable 
and banking market concentration (Concentration X Registry) are positive and statistically 
significant at the 1% level. The same is true for the coefficients on private bureau (Bureau) and 
the interaction between this variable and concentration (Concentration X Bureau) in Models 7 
to 9. These findings suggest that, although an increase in credit registry and private bureau 
coverage is associated with a reduction in loan default rate, the reduction in loan default rate 
decreases with banking market concentration.  
[Table 6 about here] 
To show the moderating role of banking market concentration, we evaluate the statistical and 
economic significance of the above findings by presenting the marginal effect of the depth of 
information sharing evaluated at the sample mean of default and at the relevant levels of 
banking market concentration (see Table 6). The results suggest that the effect of credit 
information sharing on loan default is also economically significant. For instance, based on 
Models 1 to 3 of Table 5, the marginal effect analysis in Table 6 shows that, at the 25th 
percentile of concentration, a one standard deviation increase in the depth of credit information 
sharing could reduce loan default by about 2.23-2.27 percentage points in the short run (Panel 
1). This effect reduces to 1.95-1.99 percentage points at the 75th percentile of banking market 
concentration. Thus, the change in the reduction in loan default for a country moving from the 
25th percentile to the 75th percentile of banking market concentration is approximately 0.3 
percentage points, which is statistically significant at the 1% level. In the long run (Panel 2), 
the same shift in banking market concentration (from the 25th to the 75th percentiles) could 
reduce the effect of credit information sharing by approximately 1 percentage point. Similar 
results are obtained from the marginal effect analysis based on credit registry (Models 4-6) and 
private bureau (Models 1-9) coverage, although the moderating role of concentration is 
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relatively small for a one standard deviation change. Overall, the foregoing suggests that 
banking market concentration moderates the effect of credit information sharing on loan 
default, providing support for our second research hypothesis (H2). 
As in Table 3, the coefficients on Concentration in Table 5 remain positive and largely 
significant indicating that banking market concentration, on average, increases loan default 
rate. Moreover, the interaction terms between Concentration and the credit information sharing 
variables are positive and significant, suggesting that banking market concentration increases 
loan default, especially in an environment where credit information is shared. Thus, it seems 
banks in concentrated markets tend to benefit less from credit information sharing. This may 
be explained by the view that information sharing reduces the informational rent and the 
resulting competitive advantage a bank derives from its private investment in collecting 
information about its borrowers (Cetorelli and Peretto, 2000). Information sharing, therefore, 
seems to end up weakening the private incentive for banks in concentrated markets to invest in 
screening technologies to accumulate credible borrower information. This then leads to the 
generation and sharing of low quality information among lenders, which in turn results in poor 
lending decisions and higher default rates. Another plausible interpretation is that lending in 
concentrated markets may be driven more by personal and close ties between lenders and 
borrowers developed over time than by the economic dictates of the available credit 
information. Banks, therefore, choose to lend to a long-standing client even when available 
information requires credit to be denied.    
 
4.3 Information sharing, loan default and governance quality 
In this section, we focus on the moderating role of governance quality – rule of law (Law), 
regulatory quality (Regulation) and control of corruption (Control) – underpinning the extent 
of creditor protection in banking markets. The results in Table 7 show that the coefficients on 
the credit information sharing variables remain negative and statistically significant. However, 
the moderating role of the governance indicators on the credit information sharing–loan default 
rate link is mixed. For instance, when we consider the rule of law, its moderating impact is 
statistically insignificant in two out of our three proxies for information sharing (i.e., Depth 
and Bureau). It is only when information sharing is measured by the number of people and 
firms covered by a public credit registry (i.e., Registry) that we observe a positive and 
statistically significant interaction effect. Again, inconclusive results are observed for the 
26 
 
 
regulatory quality indicator with the information sharing measure, Depth (Registry), showing 
a statistically negative (positive) interaction effect, while the Bureau measure had an 
insignificant interaction effect. Finally, the control of corruption indicator (Control) 
consistently shows an insignificant interaction effect across all models. Overall, our results for 
the moderating role of governance quality11 are inconclusive, but they seem to largely tilt 
towards the conclusion that the role of credit information sharing in reducing loan default rates 
is not systematically higher or lower in better-governed countries, relative to poorly-governed 
countries. Therefore, Hypothesis 3 (H3) does not seem to be supported by our results, or, at 
least, H3 is only weakly supported in the rule of law and regulatory quality dimensions. 
 [Table 7 about here] 
 
4.4 Information sharing, loan default, banking market concentration and governance 
quality 
In this section, we control jointly for the interaction effects of banking market concentration 
and national governance quality on the relationship between credit information sharing and 
loan default rate. The results in Table 8 show that the coefficients on the credit information 
sharing variables remain negative across all models. Also, the coefficients remain statistically 
significant at the 1% level across all models. These results confirm our prior findings, 
suggesting that the depth of credit information sharing, credit registry coverage, as well as 
private bureau coverage, all reduce loan default rate, and thus providing support for Hypothesis 
1. Further, the coefficient on the interaction terms between Concentration and the information 
sharing variables remains positive and statistically significant at the 1% level. This strengthens 
our previous findings that provided support for Hypothesis 2, suggesting that the effect of credit 
information sharing on loan default decreases with banking market concentration. We also 
provide support for the mixed role of governance indicators in the relationship between 
information sharing and loan default, although the evidence seems to point more to a lack of 
statistically significant moderating role of governance. 
[Table 8 about here] 
                                                          
11 When we utilise Principal Component Analysis to construct a single composite governance quality measure 
from the three governance variables (rule of law, regulatory quality, and the control of corruption) and re-run 
regressions with the composite measure of governance quality, the results remain mixed. These results are 
untabulated to save space. We are grateful to an anonymous reviewer for suggesting this robustness testing.   
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4.5 Credit information sharing and loan default rate – The endogeneity issue 
In this section, we address the potential of endogeneity problems that may plague our findings. 
Such problems may arise from possible simultaneous determination of credit information 
sharing and loan default rate. For instance, it is likely that a move towards facilitating lending 
decisions may lead to a decision to establish credit information sharing schemes. Also, it is 
possible that relevant omitted variables could jointly determine both lending and default rates, 
as well as the degree of information sharing. These may, however, not be a problem in our set-
up for two main reasons. First, we instigate loan default rate at the bank level in relation to 
credit information sharing mechanism at the country level; individual bank-level lending 
decisions are less likely to be directly influenced by country-level information sharing 
mechanism. Further, our econometric set-up – the dynamic systems GMM technique – 
simultaneously estimates the model in first-differences and in levels in order to eliminate the 
potential bias from omitted unobserved bank- and country-specific factors that are invariant 
across time (Bond et al., 2001). This notwithstanding, we explicitly attempt to address this 
concern by extending our analysis to control for factors that may influence the decision to set 
up credit information schemes. We present the results in Table 9. 
Consistent with Büyükkarabacak (2012) and Houston et al. (2010), who identify urbanisation, 
ethnic fractionisation and geographical latitude as potential determinants of information flow, 
we control for these additional factors in our GMM set-up. As argued in Büyükkarabacak 
(2012), a high rate of urbanisation impedes the dissemination of information in a country and 
could, lead to increased default rates. However, urbanisation can also increase lending 
concentration and improve the acquisition of soft information, and thereby, improving loan 
quality. Consistent with the latter argument, we observe that urbanisation is associated with 
lower loan defaults. Moreover, it is argued that geography defines overall institutional 
development, and consequently financial development (Acemoglu et al., 2005; Beck, et al., 
2009). It could, thus, impact the financial system and default rates. Consistently, we find that 
geographic latitude is associated with lower loan default. Further, ethnic fractionisation could 
be associated with high degree of agency problems (Djankov, et al., 2007), which could worsen 
credit risk. Consistent with this argument, we find that ethnic fractionisation increases loan 
default. 
 [Table 9 about here] 
28 
 
 
The results in Table 9 confirm the negative effect of credit information sharing on bank loan 
default rate. The coefficients on the depth of credit information as well as credit registry and 
private bureau coverage enter all the models with a negative sign and are statistically 
significant. Additionally, the interaction term between credit information sharing variables and 
banking market concentration remains positive and significant at the 1% level. The coefficients 
on the interactions between the governance indicators and information sharing remain 
qualitatively similar to those reported earlier. Overall, these findings corroborate our earlier 
findings suggesting that credit information sharing reduces loan default but less so in more 
concentrated banking markets. 
 
4.6 Further robustness tests 
Thus far, our measure of loan default rate has been non-performing loans rates. We now 
consider the robustness of our findings to an alternative dependent variable - net charge-offs 
rates (defined as net charge-offs / average gross loans), which reflects the actual loan write-
offs. As seen from Table 10, the results that credit information sharing improves loan quality 
remain unchanged. The moderating effect of banking market concentration is also robust to 
using the net charge-offs measure of loan default rates. In untabulated results, we also use 
country-level loan default rates (instead of firm-level measures) as our dependent variable and 
find qualitatively similar results.  
[Table 10 about here] 
 
Second, we replace our broad country-level regulation variable with a narrowly-defined set of 
variables (i.e., Activity Restriction, Capital Stringency, and Supervisory Power) reflecting 
different banking regulatory regimes (Barth et al., 2013). The results reported in Table 11 
support our main conclusions on the effect of credit information sharing on loan default rates 
and the interaction role of concentration. With respect to the banking regulatory variables, both 
capital stringency and supervisory power impact default rates negatively, while activity 
restriction has a positive, but insignificant effect on loan default rates. 
 [Table 11 about here] 
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5. Conclusion 
The findings of prior studies suggest that credit information sharing can have a number of 
positive effects, including reducing loan default rates, enhancing access to private credit and 
improving credit market performance (Jappelli, and Pagano, 2002; Brown et al. 2009; Fosu, 
2014). However, the extent to which credit information sharing influences loan default rate has 
rarely been examined, particularly in developing countries. Consequently, in this paper, we 
offer fresh perspectives to the growing literature on credit information sharing by empirically 
examining the relationship between credit information sharing and loan default in developing 
countries, where information asymmetry problems are acute. In particular and motivated by 
the growing attention being paid to banking market concentration and credit information 
mechanisms in developing countries, we provide first-hand evidence using a sample of 879 
banks from 87 countries from every continent over a nine-year period (i.e., over 6,300 
observations). Notably, evidence presented in this paper indicates that credit information 
sharing leads to a reduction in banks’ loan default rate. However, the extent to which credit 
default reduces in response to credit information sharing is moderated by banking market 
concentration and, to some extent, national governance quality. These findings are new and 
robust to alternative econometric specifications. 
Our study, therefore, contributes to the literature by incorporating bank heterogeneity across 
markets, as well as providing a more generalizable findings than prior studies. We further offer 
a more focused analysis by not merely considering the presence or absence of information 
sharing schemes, but rather examining how the nature and quality of the information sharing 
schemes may impact actual loan default rates, not the probability of default, as used in some 
prior research (e.g., Behr and Sonnekalb, 2012).  Moreover, we make an additional contribution 
to the literature by distinctively investigating the potential moderating roles that industry 
(banking market) concentration and national governance quality (rule of law, regulatory quality 
and control of corruption) may play in the information sharing-loan default nexus. By this, we 
recognise that the extent of competitive forces and special long-term lender-borrower 
relationships in concentrated banking markets may limit or enhance the value of information 
sharing in such markets. Similarly, country-level governance issues such as the rule of law, the 
quality of regulations enacted and the levels of corruption prevailing in an environment may 
also shape the extent to which information sharing impacts loan default rates. Besides 
contributing to the information sharing literature, these analyses allow us to add to the literature 
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on the effect of market concentration and national governance quality on corporate outcomes 
(e.g., Marquez, 2002; Hauswald and Marquez, 2006; Lian, 2018).    
A major implication of the findings of our study is that greater information sharing leads to a 
lower loan default rate for borrowers in developing countries, where institutional voids make 
adverse selections and moral hazards severe problems for banks. Therefore, the promotion of 
credit information sharing schemes across developing economies seems to be a step in the right 
direction since it has the potential to improve the balance sheets of banks, boost lending and 
even make the financial system more stable. However, in order to reap greater benefits from 
information sharing, countries with highly concentrated banking markets may need to take 
steps to increase competition, and perhaps reduce the risk of inefficient lending.   
Although our study employs a large dataset comprising bank-level data from BankScope and 
country-level data from the World Bank with highly robust results, our findings may, however, 
be limited by the errors and omissions of these data sources. For instance, Bhattacharya (2003) 
points out that the BankScope database suffers from selectivity bias, and particularly in its 
coverage of firms in developing countries in that it almost completely omits rural and foreign 
banks. Given the focus of our analysis on developing countries, it is likely that our results apply 
more to domestic and commercial banks in urban centres, and generalisation to other banks 
should be carried out with caution. Future studies can, however, extend our analysis 
specifically to rural and foreign banks to see how information sharing influences the lending 
outcomes of such banks. Similarly, as with archival studies of this nature, our measures for 
credit information sharing, loan default rates, banking market concentration and governance 
quality, amongst others, may or may not reflect practice. Future research can offer additional 
and nuanced insights by conducting in-depth interviews and surveys with bankers and 
regulatory bodies regarding these issues.   
 
 
 
Appendix 1 
[Figure 1 about here] 
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Appendix 2 
[Table 12 about here] 
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[Table 13 about here] 
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Table 1: Descriptive statistics 
   Standard deviation     Percentile   
 Mean  Overall Between Within Min Max  25th 50th 75th  Obs 
NPL 0.06  0.07 0.06 0.04  0.00 0.28  0.01 0.03 0.08  6323 
Depth 3.54  2.41 2.13 1.12  0.00 6.00  0.00 5.00 6.00  6323 
Registry 9.37  13.01 11.54 6.81  0.00 63.80  0.00 1.40 16.40  6323 
Bureau 29.00  31.42 29.13 11.77  0.00 100.00  0.00 18.40 52.10  6323 
Size 6.82  1.86 1.81 0.40  3.76 10.38  5.41 6.63 8.19  6323 
Lending 0.61  0.17 0.16 0.07  0.27 0.93  0.49 0.61 0.73  6323 
Profit 0.02  0.02 0.02 0.01  -0.02 0.06  0.01 0.02 0.03  6318 
Capital 0.15  0.09 0.09 0.03  0.06 0.43  0.09 0.12 0.17  6323 
Concentration 0.56  0.15 0.13 0.06  0.23 1.00  0.45 0.56 0.68  6317 
GDP growth 4.77  4.49 2.45 3.82  -17.95 34.50  2.48 5.00 7.30  6294 
Inflation 6.63  5.33 4.28 3.73  -4.86 59.22  3.18 5.50 8.89  5868 
Law -0.22  0.72 0.70 0.09  -1.79 1.77  -0.76 -0.35 0.18  6323 
Regulation 0.06  0.70 0.69 0.11  -1.64 2.00  -0.40 0.09 0.43  6323 
Control -0.17  0.76 0.73 0.11  -1.52 2.42  -0.72 -0.34 0.13  6323 
This table presents the descriptive statistics for all variables used in this study. NPL is the ratio of non-performing loans to total loans; Depth is the depth 
of credit information, an index that captures the depth of credit information; Registry is credit registry coverage, measured as the number of individuals 
and firms listed by a public credit registry concerning the information on their borrowing history for the past five years, expressed as a percentage of 
the adult population. Bureau is credit bureau coverage and measures the number of individuals and firms listed in a private credit bureau concerning the 
information on their borrowing history for the past five years, expressed as a percentage of the adult population; Size is the logarithm of the total bank 
assets; Lending is lending specialisation and is measured as total loans as a ratio of total assets; Profit is the ratio of operating profit to total assets; 
Capital is the ratio of book value of equity to total assets; Concentration is the three-bank concentration ratio, measured as the share of assets of the 
largest three banks as a percentage of total banking assets; GDP growth is the annual percentage change in real GDP; Inflation is the annual percentage 
change in the consumer price index; Law, Regulation and Control are respectively Rule of law, Regulatory quality and Control of corruption, indicators 
capturing the quality of governance, all of which are defined in detail in subsection 4.2. 
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   Table 2: Correlations matrix 
               
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 
1. NPL 1.00              
2. Depth -0.09a 1.00             
3. Registry 0.04a 0.45a 1.00            
4. Bureau -0.13a 0.67a 0.24a 1.00           
5. Size -0.16a 0.13a -0.07a 0.10a 1.00          
6. Lending 0.06a 0.17a 0.12a 0.03 -0.08a 1.00         
7. Profit -0.25a -0.09a -0.08a -0.06a -0.03 0.01 1.00        
8. Capital 0.11a 0.09a 0.02 0.07a -0.34a 0.05a 0.25a 1.00       
9. Concentration 0.06a -0.19a -0.01 -0.16a -0.20a -0.15a 0.00 -0.09a 1.00      
10. GDP Growth -0.13a -0.17a -0.13a -0.13a -0.04a -0.10a 0.19a -0.00 0.14a 1.00     
11. Inflation -0.01 -0.27a -0.13a -0.22a -0.12a -0.08a 0.15a 0.01 -0.03 0.08a 1.00    
12. Law -0.05a 0.13a -0.05a 0.23a 0.40a 0.04a -0.08a 0.02 -0.11a -0.07a -0.33a 1.00   
13. Regulation -0.09a 0.21a -0.06a 0.24a 0.36a 0.07a -0.10a 0.03 -0.17a -0.12a -0.38a 0.88a 1.00  
14. Corruption -0.12a 0.19a -0.04a 0.34a 0.38a 0.01 -0.05a 0.02 -0.08a -0.06a -0.32a 0.92a 0.83a 1.00 
This table presents the unconditional correlation coefficient between any pair of variables. Variables are as described in Table 1. a indicates significance at 1% or better. 
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    Table 3: Information sharing and loan default 
          
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 Model 8 Model 9 
Lagged Logit(NPL) 0.726*** 0.725*** 0.711*** 0.739*** 0.738*** 0.725*** 0.702*** 0.704*** 0.698*** 
 (0.054) (0.054) (0.055) (0.050) (0.049) (0.050) (0.053) (0.052) (0.053) 
Size 0.044 0.049* 0.059** 0.019 0.028 0.038 0.023 0.031 0.037 
 (0.027) (0.027) (0.028) (0.026) (0.026) (0.027) (0.029) (0.029) (0.030) 
Lending -0.315 -0.304 -0.357 -0.411* -0.386* -0.442* -0.522** -0.500* -0.529** 
 (0.231) (0.228) (0.238) (0.232) (0.228) (0.239) (0.260) (0.256) (0.262) 
Profit -9.570*** -9.633*** -9.832*** -8.962*** -9.098*** -9.268*** -9.880*** -9.906*** -9.973*** 
 (1.982) (1.978) (2.017) (1.833) (1.843) (1.874) (2.044) (2.036) (2.052) 
Capital 0.293 0.325 0.387 -0.062 0.014 0.072 0.053 0.119 0.150 
 (0.540) (0.530) (0.559) (0.509) (0.500) (0.530) (0.595) (0.584) (0.598) 
GDP Growth -0.029*** -0.029*** -0.030*** -0.027*** -0.027*** -0.027*** -0.028*** -0.028*** -0.028*** 
 (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.004) (0.004) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) 
Inflation -0.007 -0.010* -0.011** -0.002 -0.006 -0.007 -0.006 -0.008* -0.009* 
 (0.005) (0.005) (0.006) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) 
Concentration 1.255*** 1.225*** 1.366*** 1.358*** 1.316*** 1.463*** 1.359*** 1.336*** 1.406*** 
 (0.335) (0.328) (0.349) (0.336) (0.327) (0.349) (0.348) (0.343) (0.354) 
Depth -0.074*** -0.071*** -0.073***       
 (0.018) (0.017) (0.018)       
Registry    -0.007*** -0.007*** -0.008***    
    (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)    
Bureau       -0.008*** -0.007*** -0.007*** 
       (0.002) (0.001) (0.002) 
Law -0.073   -0.067   -0.004   
 (0.050)   (0.049)   (0.054)   
Regulation  -0.135***   -0.151***   -0.064  
  (0.050)   (0.051)   (0.049)  
Control   -0.163***   -0.182***   -0.085* 
   (0.047)   (0.047)   (0.049) 
Constant -1.380*** -1.382*** -1.588*** -1.449*** -1.367*** -1.678*** -1.300*** -1.342*** -1.462*** 
 (0.397) (0.382) (0.413) (0.370) (0.373) (0.391) (0.402) (0.389) (0.414) 
Observations 4995 4995 4995 4995 4995 4995 4995 4995 4995 
Hansen test p-value 0.126 0.134 0.194 0.200 0.207 0.290 0.299 0.285 0.313 
AR(1)test p-value 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
AR(2) test p-value 0.782 0.785 0.796 0.777 0.778 0.788 0.825 0.824 0.831 
This table shows the dynamic system GMM estimation results for the effect of credit information on bank credit default rate. Time fixed effects are included in all estimations. All variables are 
as described in Table 1. Robust Windmeijer (2005) finite-sample corrected standard errors are in parentheses. *, **, *** indicate significance at 10%, 5% and 1% respectively. 
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Table 4: Marginal effect of information sharing on non-performing loans (NPL) 
 (1) (2) (3) 
 Rule of law Regulatory quality Control of corruption 
Panel 1: Short-run effect    
    
Depth -0.919*** -0.888*** -0.909*** 
 (0.204) (0.199) (0.204) 
    
Registry -0.510*** -0.510*** -0.529*** 
 (0.161) (0.161) (0.162) 
    
Bureau -1.185*** -1.134*** -1.098*** 
 (0.216) (0.209) (0.219) 
    
Panel 2: Long-run effect    
    
Depth -3.352*** -3.229*** -3.147*** 
 (0.534) (0.533) (0.524) 
 
    
Registry -1.952*** -1.946*** -1.920*** 
 (0.559) (0.559) (0.546) 
    
Bureau -3.981*** -3.836*** -3.638*** 
 (0.623) (0.625) (0.647) 
This table shows the marginal effect of one standard deviation change in credit information on NPL. All variables are as described in Table 1. Standard errors are in parentheses. *** indicates 1%. 
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 Table 5: Information sharing and loan default rates – Interaction with banking market concentration 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
Lagged Logit(NPL) 0.740*** 0.740*** 0.729*** 0.747*** 0.747*** 0.736*** 0.735*** 0.737*** 0.733*** 
 (0.050) (0.050) (0.050) (0.046) (0.046) (0.047) (0.052) (0.051) (0.053) 
Size 0.045* 0.053** 0.061** 0.014 0.024 0.034 0.031 0.034 0.044 
 (0.026) (0.025) (0.026) (0.025) (0.025) (0.026) (0.027) (0.027) (0.028) 
Lending -0.317 -0.303 -0.347 -0.413* -0.385* -0.432* -0.390 -0.375 -0.394 
 (0.221) (0.218) (0.226) (0.222) (0.219) (0.229) (0.239) (0.236) (0.242) 
Profit -9.239*** -9.332*** -9.468*** -8.713*** -8.828*** -8.968*** -9.076*** -9.062*** -9.082*** 
 (1.858) (1.860) (1.887) (1.742) (1.754) (1.781) (1.911) (1.901) (1.912) 
Capital 0.348 0.403 0.467 -0.124 -0.038 0.024 0.123 0.153 0.211 
 (0.512) (0.503) (0.529) (0.488) (0.480) (0.506) (0.555) (0.544) (0.556) 
GDP Growth -0.026*** -0.026*** -0.026*** -0.025*** -0.026*** -0.026*** -0.026*** -0.026*** -0.025*** 
 (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) 
Inflation -0.009 -0.011** -0.013** -0.002 -0.005 -0.007 -0.006 -0.008 -0.009* 
 (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.004) (0.004) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) 
Concentration 0.161 0.118 0.200 0.798*** 0.768*** 0.891*** 0.532** 0.515** 0.536** 
 (0.161) (0.160) (0.164) (0.253) (0.248) (0.266) (0.211) (0.208) (0.213) 
Depth -0.274*** -0.274*** -0.281***       
 (0.069) (0.068) (0.068)       
Registry    -0.042*** -0.041*** -0.041***    
    (0.010) (0.010) (0.010)    
Bureau       -0.021*** -0.021*** -0.021*** 
       (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) 
Concentration X Depth 0.344*** 0.349*** 0.359***       
 (0.098) (0.097) (0.098)       
Concentration X Registry    0.064*** 0.062*** 0.061***    
    (0.016) (0.016) (0.016)    
Concentration X Bureau       0.026*** 0.025*** 0.027*** 
       (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) 
Law -0.050   -0.049   -0.025   
 (0.046)   (0.047)   (0.051)   
Regulation  -0.122***   -0.130***   -0.061  
  (0.046)   (0.048)   (0.047)  
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Control   -0.151***   -0.164***   -0.108** 
   (0.043)   (0.044)   (0.048) 
Constant -0.670** -0.687** -0.850*** -1.067*** -1.099*** -1.295*** -0.836** -0.844*** -0.969*** 
 (0.298) (0.279) (0.304) (0.333) (0.323) (0.352) (0.338) (0.323) (0.346) 
Observations 4995 4995 4995 4995 4995 4995 4995 4995 4995 
Hansen test p-value 0.136 0.143 0.197 0.392 0.379 0.452 0.240 0.231 0.243 
AR(1)test p-value 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
AR(2) test p-value 0.735 0.737 0.746 0.741 0.742 0.753 0.761 0.761 0.766 
This table shows the dynamic system GMM estimation results for the effect of credit information on bank credit default rate. Time fixed effects are included in all estimations. All variables are 
as described in Table 1. Robust Windmeijer (2005) finite-sample corrected standard errors are in parentheses. *, **, *** indicate significance at 10%, 5% and 1% respectively. 
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Table 6: Marginal effect of depth of credit information sharing on loan default at specified levels of banking market concentration 
 (1) (2) (3)  (4) (5) (6)  (7) (8) (9) 
 Depth of credit information  Credit registry  Private bureau 
 Rule of law Regulatory 
quality 
Control of 
corruption 
 Rule of law Regulatory 
quality 
Control of 
corruption 
 Depth of law Regulatory 
quality 
Control of 
corruption 
Panel 1 – Short-run analysis         
            
25th percentile -2.230*** -2.225*** -2.268***  -2.283*** -2.233*** -2.224***  -2.691*** -2.652*** -2.681*** 
 (0.415) (0.410) (0.407)  (0.418) (0.417) (0.419)  (0.427) (0.426) (0.430) 
50th percentile -2.096*** -2.089*** -2.130***  -2.259*** -2.209*** -2.200***  -2.683*** -2.643*** -2.672*** 
 (0.394) (0.389) (0.387)  (0.415) (0.414) (0.416)  (0.426) (0.425) (0.429) 
75th percentile -1.956*** -1.946*** -1.985***  -2.234*** -2.185*** -2.177***  -2.674*** -2.635*** -2.663*** 
 (0.371) (0.367) (0.365)  (0.412) (0.411) (0.413)  (0.425) (0.424) (0.428) 
Change 0.274*** 0.279*** 0.284***  0.049*** 0.048*** 0.047***  0.017*** 0.017*** 0.018*** 
 (0.050) (0.049) (0.048)  (0.006) (0.007) (0.007)  (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
            
Panel 2 – Long-run analysis 
 
         
25th percentile -8.588*** -8.542*** -8.361***  -9.008*** -8.824*** -8.421***  -10.160*** -10.090*** -10.025*** 
 (1.142) (1.134) (1.104)  (1.584) (1.606) (1.563)  (1.587) (1.611) (1.592) 
50th percentile -8.071*** -8.019*** -7.850***  -8.913*** -8.730*** -8.332***  -10.128*** -10.058*** -9.991*** 
 (1.067) (1.060) (1.033)  (1.570) (1.591) (1.549)  (1.582) (1.606) (1.586) 
75th percentile -7.531*** -7.472*** -7.315***  -8.816*** -8.635*** -8.242***  -10.095*** -10.025*** -9.958*** 
 (0.989) (0.982) (0.959)  (1.556) (1.577) (1.535)  (1.576) (1.601) (1.581) 
Change 1.057*** 1.070*** 1.046***  0.192*** 0.189*** 0.179***  0.064*** 0.065*** 0.067*** 
 (0.180) (0.178) (0.173)  (0.032) (0.032) (0.031)  (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) 
This table shows the marginal effect of one standard deviation change in credit information on NPL. All variables are as described in Table 1. Standard errors are in parentheses. *** indicates 1%. 
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 Table 7: Information sharing and loan default – Interactions with governance variables 
          
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 Model 8 Model 9 
Lagged Logit(NPL) 0.729*** 0.723*** 0.711*** 0.725*** 0.729*** 0.722*** 0.707*** 0.705*** 0.704*** 
 (0.054) (0.054) (0.054) (0.050) (0.050) (0.050) (0.052) (0.052) (0.053) 
Size 0.044 0.051* 0.058** 0.023 0.029 0.038 0.024 0.031 0.038 
 (0.027) (0.027) (0.028) (0.027) (0.027) (0.027) (0.029) (0.029) (0.029) 
Lending -0.312 -0.324 -0.376 -0.446* -0.421* -0.453* -0.501** -0.507** -0.501* 
 (0.229) (0.229) (0.240) (0.239) (0.235) (0.241) (0.253) (0.256) (0.256) 
Profit -9.489*** -9.505*** -9.722*** -9.251*** -9.352*** -9.352*** -9.842*** -9.824*** -9.907*** 
 (1.973) (1.962) (2.011) (1.899) (1.899) (1.896) (2.037) (2.047) (2.041) 
Capital 0.285 0.272 0.353 -0.017 0.041 0.068 0.064 0.107 0.165 
 (0.539) (0.530) (0.562) (0.530) (0.518) (0.533) (0.589) (0.584) (0.592) 
GDP Growth -0.029*** -0.029*** -0.030*** -0.028*** -0.028*** -0.028*** -0.028*** -0.028*** -0.028*** 
 (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) 
Inflation -0.007 -0.008 -0.010* -0.005 -0.007 -0.008 -0.006 -0.007 -0.009* 
 (0.006) (0.005) (0.006) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) 
Concentration 1.234*** 1.224*** 1.339*** 1.500*** 1.379*** 1.495*** 1.326*** 1.338*** 1.355*** 
 (0.340) (0.326) (0.350) (0.351) (0.334) (0.351) (0.333) (0.335) (0.336) 
Depth -0.074*** -0.075*** -0.078***       
 (0.016) (0.018) (0.017)       
          
Registry    -0.007*** -0.009*** -0.007***    
    (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)    
          
Bureau       -0.007*** -0.007*** -0.007*** 
       (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
Law X Depth -0.003         
 (0.017)         
Regulation X Depth  -0.041**        
  (0.017)        
Control X Depth   -0.017       
   (0.016)       
Law X Registry    0.011***      
    (0.003)      
Regulation X Registry     0.006***     
     (0.002)     
Control X Registry      0.005    
      (0.003)    
Law X Bureau       0.001   
       (0.001)   
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Regulation X Bureau        -0.001  
        (0.001)  
Control X Bureau         0.001 
         (0.001) 
Law -0.060   -0.170***   -0.026   
 (0.090)   (0.056)   (0.075)   
          
          
Regulation  0.031   -0.197***   -0.037  
  (0.084)   (0.056)   (0.077)  
          
          
Control   -0.093   -0.208***   -0.119 
   (0.085)   (0.050)   (0.077) 
          
Constant -1.357*** -1.364*** -1.535*** -1.571*** -1.405*** -1.605*** -1.283*** -1.344*** -1.441*** 
 (0.407) (0.381) (0.420) (0.384) (0.380) (0.408) (0.397) (0.388) (0.412) 
Observations 4995 4995 4995 4995 4995 4995 4995 4995 4995 
Hansen test p-value 0.127 0.178 0.227 0.324 0.272 0.313 0.290 0.294 0.296 
AR(1)test p-value 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
AR(2) test p-value 0.781 0.791 0.803 0.782 0.787 0.788 0.818 0.826 0.823 
This table shows the dynamic system GMM estimation results for the effect of credit information on bank credit default rate. Time fixed effects are included in all estimations. All variables are as described in Table 1. 
Robust Windmeijer (2005) fïnite-sample corrected standard errors are in parentheses. *, **, *** indicate significance at 10%, 5% and 1% respectively. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
44 
 
 
     Table 8: Information sharing and loan default – Interaction with banking market concentration and governance quality 
          
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 Model 8 Model 9 
Lagged Logit(NPL) 0.742*** 0.738*** 0.727*** 0.739*** 0.739*** 0.733*** 0.734*** 0.736*** 0.732*** 
 (0.050) (0.050) (0.050) (0.047) (0.047) (0.048) (0.051) (0.051) (0.052) 
Size 0.045* 0.054** 0.062** 0.018 0.024 0.033 0.031 0.035 0.044 
 (0.026) (0.026) (0.027) (0.026) (0.026) (0.026) (0.027) (0.027) (0.028) 
Lending -0.318 -0.315 -0.376 -0.427* -0.425* -0.441* -0.398* -0.384 -0.401* 
 (0.220) (0.219) (0.229) (0.227) (0.227) (0.230) (0.237) (0.236) (0.241) 
Profit -9.177*** -9.217*** -9.367*** -8.805*** -9.031*** -9.041*** -9.078*** -9.021*** -9.081*** 
 (1.853) (1.855) (1.884) (1.793) (1.809) (1.802) (1.922) (1.916) (1.925) 
Capital 0.340 0.363 0.434 -0.065 -0.007 0.017 0.119 0.139 0.207 
 (0.512) (0.504) (0.532) (0.503) (0.499) (0.508) (0.558) (0.545) (0.560) 
GDP Growth -0.026*** -0.026*** -0.026*** -0.027*** -0.027*** -0.027*** -0.025*** -0.026*** -0.025*** 
 (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) 
Inflation -0.008 -0.010* -0.011** -0.005 -0.007 -0.008 -0.006 -0.007 -0.008* 
 (0.005) (0.005) (0.006) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) 
Concentration 0.144 0.137 0.141 0.813*** 0.735*** 0.905*** 0.534** 0.531** 0.538** 
 (0.166) (0.156) (0.170) (0.261) (0.251) (0.268) (0.211) (0.206) (0.212) 
Depth -0.275*** -0.271*** -0.297***       
 (0.067) (0.068) (0.068)       
Registry    -0.046*** -0.049*** -0.041***    
    (0.010) (0.011) (0.010)    
Bureau       -0.021*** -0.020*** -0.021*** 
       (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) 
Concentration X Depth 0.344*** 0.340*** 0.371***       
 (0.097) (0.097) (0.098)       
Concentration X Registry    0.073*** 0.073*** 0.064***    
    (0.017) (0.017) (0.016)    
Concentration X Bureau       0.026*** 0.025*** 0.027*** 
       (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) 
Law X Depth -0.007         
 (0.016)         
Regulation X Depth  -0.029*        
  (0.015)        
Control X Depth   -0.025*       
   (0.015)       
Law X Registry    0.013***      
    (0.003)      
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Regulation X Registry     0.009***     
     (0.002)     
Control X Registry      0.006*    
      (0.003)    
Law X Bureau       -0.000   
       (0.001)   
Regulation X Bureau        -0.001  
        (0.001)  
Control X Bureau         -0.000 
         (0.001) 
Law -0.021   -0.161***   -0.014   
 (0.081)   (0.053)   (0.070)   
Regulation  -0.006   -0.196***   -0.035  
  (0.080)   (0.054)   (0.073)  
Control   -0.050   -0.195***   -0.096 
   (0.076)   (0.047)   (0.071) 
Constant -0.646** -0.686** -0.767** -1.117*** -1.070*** -1.298*** -0.837** -0.854*** -0.967*** 
 (0.307) (0.279) (0.313) (0.344) (0.329) (0.354) (0.340) (0.323) (0.350) 
Observations 4995 4995 4995 4995 4995 4995 4995 4995 4995 
Hansen test p-value 0.141 0.173 0.249 0.517 0.498 0.484 0.237 0.231 0.241 
AR(1)test p-value 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
AR(2) test p-value 0.736 0.742 0.757 0.749 0.757 0.751 0.762 0.764 0.767 
This table shows the dynamic system GMM estimation results for the effect of credit information on bank credit default rate. Time fixed effects are included in all estimations. All variables are as described in 
Table 1. Robust Windmeijer (2005) finite-sample corrected standard errors are in parentheses. *, **, *** indicates significance at 10%, 5% and 1% respectively. 
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   Table 9: Information sharing and loan default – Additional control variables 
          
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 Model 8 Model 9 
Lagged Logit(NPL) 0.731*** 0.733*** 0.729*** 0.748*** 0.741*** 0.740*** 0.792*** 0.789*** 0.788*** 
 (0.065) (0.065) (0.066) (0.068) (0.069) (0.069) (0.070) (0.071) (0.069) 
Size 0.024 0.029 0.030 0.008 0.012 0.013 0.021 0.019 0.024 
 (0.035) (0.036) (0.035) (0.035) (0.037) (0.036) (0.033) (0.035) (0.033) 
Lending -0.411 -0.373 -0.407 -0.466 -0.477* -0.465 -0.263 -0.281 -0.260 
 (0.270) (0.261) (0.273) (0.286) (0.286) (0.287) (0.261) (0.267) (0.260) 
Profit -5.866*** -5.789*** -5.866*** -5.585** -5.742** -5.749** -5.178** -5.238** -5.360** 
 (2.209) (2.196) (2.246) (2.254) (2.307) (2.281) (2.189) (2.239) (2.207) 
Capital -0.453 -0.428 -0.373 -0.638 -0.626 -0.613 -0.306 -0.358 -0.290 
 (0.657) (0.651) (0.663) (0.681) (0.694) (0.682) (0.655) (0.672) (0.649) 
GDP Growth -0.034*** -0.033*** -0.033*** -0.037*** -0.036*** -0.036*** -0.031*** -0.031*** -0.030*** 
 (0.008) (0.007) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) 
Inflation -0.007 -0.008 -0.009 -0.004 -0.005 -0.004 -0.004 -0.003 -0.006 
 (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) 
Concentration 0.338* 0.456** 0.325* 0.895*** 0.944*** 0.945*** 0.465** 0.543** 0.485** 
 (0.188) (0.182) (0.187) (0.345) (0.356) (0.347) (0.230) (0.236) (0.231) 
Depth -0.259*** -0.236*** -0.277***       
 (0.082) (0.079) (0.085)       
Registry    -0.034*** -0.035*** -0.034***    
    (0.011) (0.011) (0.011)    
Bureau       -0.017*** -0.016*** -0.017*** 
       (0.006) (0.006) (0.005) 
Concentration X Depth 0.331*** 0.298*** 0.342***       
 (0.117) (0.112) (0.119)       
Concentration X Registry    0.061*** 0.059*** 0.057***    
    (0.018) (0.018) (0.018)    
Concentration X Bureau       0.021*** 0.020** 0.021*** 
       (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) 
Law X Depth -0.033         
 (0.020)         
Regulation X Depth  -0.045**        
  (0.022)        
Control X Depth   -0.055**       
   (0.022)       
Law X Registry    0.005*      
    (0.003)      
Regulation X Registry     0.003     
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     (0.003)     
Control X Registry      -0.002    
      (0.003)    
Law X Bureau       -0.001   
       (0.001)   
Regulation X Bureau        -0.002*  
        (0.001)  
Control X Bureau         -0.001 
         (0.001) 
Law 0.183*   0.048   0.124   
 (0.099)   (0.049)   (0.076)   
Regulation  0.174*   0.008   0.161**  
  (0.098)   (0.049)   (0.076)  
Control   0.186*   0.035   0.056 
   (0.103)   (0.051)   (0.076) 
Ethnic fractinisation 0.506** 0.534** 0.585** 0.384* 0.432* 0.443** 0.363* 0.380* 0.377* 
 (0.226) (0.233) (0.240) (0.214) (0.226) (0.220) (0.208) (0.218) (0.209) 
Latitude -0.924* -0.844* -0.859* -0.886* -0.809* -0.763 -0.923* -0.937* -0.884* 
 (0.480) (0.466) (0.475) (0.475) (0.473) (0.467) (0.491) (0.489) (0.486) 
Urbanisation -0.002 -0.001 -0.000 -0.006** -0.005** -0.005** -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
Constant -0.629* -0.864** -0.782** -0.755* -0.918** -0.932** -0.656* -0.741* -0.750** 
 (0.372) (0.372) (0.373) (0.417) (0.457) (0.425) (0.371) (0.385) (0.370) 
Observations 3703 3703 3703 3703 3703 3703 3703 3703 3703 
Hansen test p-value 0.893 0.887 0.905 0.835 0.845 0.868 0.306 0.309 0.359 
AR(1)test p-value 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
AR(2) test p-value 0.788 0.791 0.798 0.711 0.712 0.712 0.721 0.716 0.722 
This table shows the dynamic system GMM estimation results for the effect of credit information on bank credit default rate. Time fixed effects are included in all estimations. All variables are 
as described in Table 1. Robust Windmeijer (2005) finite-sample corrected standard errors are in parentheses. *, **, *** indicates significance at 10%, 5% and 1% respectively. 
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Table 10: Information sharing and loan default – Using net charge offs as an alternative dependent variable  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
L.Logit(net charge offs) 0.295*** 0.298*** 0.299*** 0.290*** 0.293*** 0.308*** 0.290*** 0.301*** 0.297*** 
 (0.073) (0.074) (0.073) (0.073) (0.075) (0.070) (0.074) (0.073) (0.074) 
Size 0.155* 0.128 0.138* 0.161** 0.117 0.142* 0.158* 0.128 0.134* 
 (0.081) (0.079) (0.077) (0.081) (0.080) (0.077) (0.081) (0.079) (0.078) 
Lending -2.064*** -2.095*** -2.235*** -2.222*** -2.279*** -2.199*** -2.001*** -2.047*** -2.126*** 
 (0.697) (0.701) (0.707) (0.710) (0.709) (0.705) (0.700) (0.694) (0.705) 
Profit -10.784** -11.137** -10.166* -12.452** -11.480** -10.837** -10.991** -10.654* -10.516* 
 (5.481) (5.550) (5.590) (5.559) (5.607) (5.498) (5.473) (5.509) (5.535) 
Capital 1.625 1.365 1.528 1.909 1.245 1.785 1.720 1.473 1.528 
 (1.440) (1.421) (1.443) (1.485) (1.437) (1.484) (1.443) (1.408) (1.442) 
GDP Growth -0.017 -0.020 -0.015 -0.010 -0.023 -0.009 -0.018 -0.019 -0.017 
 (0.016) (0.015) (0.015) (0.015) (0.015) (0.016) (0.016) (0.015) (0.015) 
Inflation -0.006 -0.002 -0.003 -0.013 -0.005 -0.009 -0.009 0.006 -0.009 
 (0.011) (0.011) (0.010) (0.011) (0.011) (0.010) (0.012) (0.013) (0.012) 
Concentration 2.893*** 3.017*** 2.913*** -0.459 1.921** 0.756 3.014*** 3.154*** 2.849*** 
 (0.931) (0.946) (0.934) (0.603) (0.893) (0.719) (0.939) (0.951) (0.928) 
Depth -0.085*   -0.616***   -0.089*   
 (0.045)   (0.169)   (0.047)   
Registry  -0.014*   -0.094**   -0.023**  
  (0.007)   (0.038)   (0.010)  
Bureau   -0.006   -0.047***   -0.008* 
   (0.004)   (0.013)   (0.005) 
Concentration X Depth    0.919***      
    (0.270)      
Concentration X Registry     0.149**     
     (0.062)     
Concentration X Bureau      0.073***    
      (0.020)    
Regulation X Depth       0.087*   
       (0.052)   
Regulation X Registry        0.025**  
        (0.011)  
Regulation X Bureau         0.005 
          
Regulation -0.103 -0.133 -0.046 -0.124 -0.095 -0.081 -0.459* -0.191 -0.250 
 (0.120) (0.119) (0.138) (0.123) (0.124) (0.139) (0.237) (0.121) (0.195) 
         (0.004) 
Constant -5.503*** -5.433*** -5.441*** -3.496*** -4.611*** -4.049*** -5.660*** -5.567*** -5.382*** 
 (1.119) (1.163) (1.131) (0.936) (1.203) (1.028) (1.135) (1.165) (1.135) 
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Observations 1908 1908 1908 1908 1908 1908 1908 1908 1908 
Hansen test p-value 0.748 0.690 0.754 0.843 0.776 0.939 0.739 0.603 0.742 
AR(1)test p-value 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
AR(2) test p-value 0.652 0.644 0.670 0.609 0.659 0.664 0.596 0.712 0.615 
This table shows the dynamic system GMM estimation results for the effect of credit information on bank net charge off rate. Time fixed effects are included in all estimations. All variables are as described in Table 1. 
Robust Windmeijer (2005) finite-sample corrected standard errors are in parentheses. *, **, *** indicates significance at 10%, 5% and 1% respectively. 
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Table 11: Information sharing and loan default - With bank regulation variables 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
Lagged Logit(NPL) 0.780*** 0.774*** 0.772*** 0.787*** 0.790*** 0.784*** 0.774*** 0.764*** 0.775*** 
 (0.054) (0.067) (0.057) (0.053) (0.061) (0.054) (0.055) (0.069) (0.057) 
Size 0.043 0.033 0.035 0.046 0.037 0.040 0.045 0.027 0.036 
 (0.032) (0.031) (0.034) (0.031) (0.029) (0.031) (0.033) (0.033) (0.034) 
Lending -0.266 -0.441 -0.430 -0.249 -0.432 -0.403 -0.275 -0.434 -0.380 
 (0.268) (0.304) (0.287) (0.260) (0.290) (0.267) (0.272) (0.309) (0.280) 
Profit -7.651*** -7.734*** -7.117*** -7.252*** -7.397*** -6.943*** -7.748*** -8.088*** -7.321*** 
 (2.079) (2.237) (2.019) (2.008) (2.081) (1.919) (2.098) (2.336) (2.058) 
Capital 0.277 0.195 0.129 0.288 0.312 0.181 0.247 0.142 0.119 
 (0.567) (0.528) (0.573) (0.554) (0.492) (0.531) (0.579) (0.545) (0.565) 
GDP per capita -0.053 -0.033 -0.025 -0.055 -0.019 -0.022 -0.060 -0.032 -0.016 
 (0.042) (0.042) (0.041) (0.041) (0.038) (0.038) (0.043) (0.044) (0.041) 
GDP Growth -0.037*** -0.040*** -0.034*** -0.036*** -0.038*** -0.032*** -0.037*** -0.042*** -0.033*** 
 (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.005) (0.006) (0.007) (0.006) 
Inflation -0.007 -0.003 -0.006 -0.008 -0.004 -0.007 -0.007 -0.005 -0.008 
 (0.005) (0.004) (0.004) (0.005) (0.004) (0.004) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) 
Concentration 0.871*** 1.342*** 0.997*** 0.082 0.307 -0.218 0.828** 1.487*** 1.131*** 
 (0.326) (0.434) (0.344) (0.194) (0.232) (0.216) (0.328) (0.468) (0.371) 
Depth -0.077*** -0.100*** -0.097*** -0.214*** -0.264*** -0.304*** -0.190*** 0.129** 0.073 
 (0.021) (0.028) (0.025) (0.066) (0.088) (0.086) (0.060) (0.057) (0.058) 
Concentration X Depth    0.247** 0.298** 0.356***    
    (0.103) (0.122) (0.120)    
Activity restrict X Depth        0.015**   
       (0.007)   
Capital stringency X Depth        -0.044***  
        (0.014)  
Supervisory power X Depth         -0.015** 
         (0.006) 
Activity restrict 0.040   0.029   -0.016   
 (0.025)   (0.023)   (0.030)   
Capital stringency  -0.127***   -0.130***   0.043  
  (0.045)   (0.045)   (0.027)  
Supervisory power   -0.036**   -0.048***   0.027 
   (0.016)   (0.018)   (0.017) 
Constant -0.859* -0.116 -0.282 -0.301 0.379 0.569 -0.361 -1.118*** -1.177** 
 (0.440) (0.319) (0.374) (0.361) (0.357) (0.393) (0.495) (0.401) (0.466) 
Observations 3633 3486 3697 3633 3486 3697 3633 3486 3697 
Hansen test p-value 0.106 0.103 0.262 0.098 0.105 0.263 0.104 0.099 0.231 
AR(1)test p-value 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
AR(2) test p-value 0.917 0.980 0.819 0.931 0.971 0.824 0.914 0.957 0.839 
51 
 
 
This table shows the dynamic system GMM estimation results for the effect of credit information on bank credit default rate. Time fixed effects are included in all estimations. All variables are as described in Table 1. Robust 
Windmeijer (2005) finite-sample corrected standard errors are in parentheses. *, **, *** indicates significance at 10%, 5% and 1% respectively. 
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Figure 1: The key channels through which credit information sharing reduces loan default rates 
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 Expand banks’ knowledge of 
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Figure 2: Trends in depth of credit information index for the group of countries with sharp and those with gradual improvements. 
Note: The list of countries showing major improvements in information sharing include: Costa Rica, Croatia, Kazakhstan, Lithuania, 
Macedonia (Fyrom), Mauritius, Mongolia, Oman, Romania, Saudi Arabia, Serbia, Albania, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Egypt, 
Georgia, Ghana, Latvia, Morocco, Rwanda, United Arab Emirates, Zambia. Please note that the countries in italics (bold) 
experienced gradual (sharp) improvements in information sharing during the sample period.   
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Table 12: List of countries and cross-sectional sample distribution 
Country 
No of 
banks 
 
Percentage Country 
No of 
banks Percentage Country 
No of 
banks Percentage 
Albania 8 0.91 Guyana 2 0.23 Peru 17 1.93 
Algeria 2 0.23 Haiti 3 0.34 Philippines 15 1.71 
Angola 5 0.57 Honduras 13 1.48 Qatar 7 0.8 
Argentina 33 3.75 Hong Kong 32 3.64 Republic of Moldova 3 0.34 
Armenia 11 1.25 Jamaica 8 0.91 Romania 9 1.02 
Azerbaijan 14 1.59 Jordan 14 1.59 Rwanda 2 0.23 
Bahamas 5 0.57 Kazakhstan 19 2.16 Saudi Arabia 12 1.37 
Bahrain 13 1.48 Kenya 28 3.19 Senegal 3 0.34 
Belarus 4 0.46 Kuwait 13 1.48 Serbia 6 0.68 
Benin 2 0.23 Kyrgyzstan 3 0.34 Sierra Leone 2 0.23 
Bolivia 10 1.14 Latvia 14 1.59 Singapore 7 0.8 
Bosnia and 
Herzegovina 9 1.02 Lithuania 7 0.8 South Africa 27 3.07 
Botswana 6 0.68 Macedonia (Fyrom) 8 0.91 Swaziland 4 0.46 
Bulgaria 14 1.59 Malawi 3 0.34 Syrian Arab Republic 3 0.34 
Cambodia 6 0.68 Malaysia 6 0.68 Tajikistan 2 0.23 
Colombia 7 0.8 Maldives 2 0.23 Thailand 6 0.68 
Costa Rica 10 1.14 Mali 3 0.34 Togo 2 0.23 
Cote D'Ivoire 2 0.23 Mauritius 7 0.8 Trinidad And Tobago 4 0.46 
Croatia 17 1.93 Mongolia 3 0.34 Tunisia 15 1.71 
Cyprus 7 0.8 Montenegro 2 0.23 Turkey 50 5.69 
Dominican Republic 9 1.02 Morocco 9 1.02 Uganda 12 1.37 
Ecuador 24 2.73 Mozambique 6 0.68 Ukraine 13 1.48 
Egypt 3 0.34 Namibia 9 1.02 United Arab Emirates 22 2.5 
El Salvador 17 1.93 Nepal 14 1.59 United Republic of Tanzania 14 1.59 
Ethiopia 2 0.23 Nicaragua 8 0.91 Uruguay 14 1.59 
Georgia 10 1.14 Niger 2 0.23 Uzbekistan 5 0.57 
Ghana 10 1.14 Oman 11 1.25 Venezuela 24 2.73 
Grenada 2 0.23 Panama 25 2.84 Vietnam 6 0.68 
Guatemala 22 2.5 Paraguay 9 1.02 Zambia 6 0.68 
This table shows the cross-sectional distribution of the sample. 
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Table 13: Cross-sectional loan default and depth of credit information (mean) 
Country NPL Depth Country NPL Depth Country NPL Depth 
Albania 0.09 3.64 Guyana 0.09 0 Peru 0.02 6 
Algeria 0.06 0 Haiti 0.02 0 Philippines 0.08 1.54 
Angola 0.06 0 Honduras 0.03 5.58 Qatar 0.02 1.02 
Argentina 0.05 6 Hong Kong 0.01 5 Republic of Moldova 0.09 0 
Armenia 0.03 4.43 Jamaica 0.06 0 Romania 0.11 4.53 
Azerbaijan 0.09 2.75 Jordan 0.10 0 Rwanda 0.15 1.09 
Bahamas 0.06 0 Kazakhstan 0.12 4.3 Saudi Arabia 0.03 4.91 
Bahrain 0.10 3 Kenya 0.10 0 Senegal 0.06 0 
Belarus 0.17 3.13 Kuwait 0.07 4.75 Serbia 0.10 4.03 
Benin 0.10 0 Kyrgyzstan 0.02 2.67 Sierra Leone 0.24 0 
Bolivia 0.08 5.57 Latvia 0.12 3 Singapore 0.02 3.32 
Bosnia and Herzegovina 0.08 4.88 Lithuania 0.09 5.37 South Africa 0.08 5.78 
Botswana 0.05 4 Macedonia (Fyrom) 0.09 2.63 Swaziland 0.05 5 
Bulgaria 0.08 4.82 Malawi 0.04 0 Syrian Arab Republic 0.08 0 
Cambodia 0.06 0.43 Malaysia 0.05 5.39 Tajikistan 0.10 0 
Colombia 0.05 5 Maldives 0.13 1.45 Thailand 0.07 4.95 
Costa Rica 0.05 4.7 Mali 0.11 0 Togo 0.09 0 
Cote D'Ivoire 0.10 0 Mauritius 0.03 2.83 Trinidad And Tobago 0.04 3.75 
Croatia 0.10 3.1 Mongolia 0.04 3 Tunisia 0.11 3.06 
Cyprus 0.09 1.2 Montenegro 0.13 2.67 Turkey 0.02 4.88 
Dominican Republic 0.03 5.98 Morocco 0.06 3.24 Uganda 0.03 0 
Ecuador 0.09 5.14 Mozambique 0.04 0 Ukraine 0.12 1.36 
Egypt 0.06 3.6 Namibia 0.03 4 United Arab Emirates 0.05 3.01 
El Salvador 0.03 5.85 Nepal 0.03 0 United Republic of Tanzania 0.07 0 
Ethiopia 0.09 0 Nicaragua 0.03 5.49 Uruguay 0.06 5.59 
Georgia 0.06 3.16 Niger 0.05 0 Uzbekistan 0.10 1.21 
Ghana 0.12 0.79 Oman 0.06 2.21 Venezuela 0.02 1.85 
Grenada 0.04 0 Panama 0.01 6 Vietnam 0.03 3.29 
Guatemala 0.04 5.5 Paraguay 0.01 6 Zambia 0.04 0.60 
This table shows the cross-sectional mean loan default and depth of information sharing index. 
 
 
